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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Both accounting conservatism and the relative information content o f cash flows 
and accruals are issues that have been recently addressed in the accounting literature.' 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) present a  valuation theory establishing a link between 
conservatism and the relative information content o f cash flows and accruals. Their 
model predicts that the information content o f accruals will increase in conservatism 
whereas the information content o f cash flows will be unaffected. Conservatism is 
defined as carrying operating assets at an amount less than fair market value. The 
purpose o f this study is to empirically test the implications o f conservatism for the 
information content o f cash flows and accruals using the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
framework. This blends three topics that are of interest within the accounting literature:
(1) the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) framework, (2) the impact o f conservatism on firm 
value and (3) the relative information content of cash flows and accruals. Results of this 
study should be o f  interest to managers, educators and analysts for assessing the potential 
information content o f cash flows and accruals, given conservatism in recording 
operating assets.
Ohlson (1995) provides the basis for the firm valuation model developed in 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995). These studies advance a structure which provides a direct 
link between firm value and accounting data. According to Hand and Landsman (1998, 
2), the Ohlson (1995) fimnework has been advocated by the Coopers & Lybrand
For example Basu (1997); Zhang (1998); and Ahmed, Morton &  Schaefer (1998) address the 
issue o f  conservatism. The relative information content o f cash flows versus accruals is examined by Black 
(1998); Ali (1994); Dechow (1994); Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1987); Cheng, Liu and Schaefer 
(1996); Bernard and Stober (1989) and Rayburn (1986).
Accounting Advisory Committee (1997) for empirical research evaluating financial 
reporting standards. This structure is currently used by researchers to ascertain how 
accounting data maps to firm value (e.g. Collins, Pincus and Xie, 1999; and Barth and 
Clinch, 1998). Because the Ohlson (1995) framework is used for assessing the value 
relevance o f  accounting data, an examination o f the model’s agreement with the empirical 
data is o f interest. This includes developing knowledge regarding the model’s 
consistency with empirical data given specific accounting conventions such as 
conservatism.
The second topic addresses how the trade off between relevance and reliability 
affects the market’s perception of accounting information. This trade off is examined in 
the accounting literature (Deng and Lev, 1998; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Barth,
Clement, Foster and Kasznik, 1998; Hirschey and Weygandt, 1985; Basu 1997). This 
paper contributes to the research by providing evidence o f how the market assigns 
weights to net-income components when conservatism is the source o f the trade-off 
between relevance and reliability.
The third topic examines how cash flows and accruals map to firm value. In the 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) fiamework, the consequence o f conservatism is that the 
market should react more strongly to accrual earnings. Yet prior studies do not provide 
clear evidence that accruals are more value relevant than cash flows, or vice versa 
(Bernard and Stober 1989; Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley 1987; Wilson 1986 and 1987; 
Rayburn 1986). Those results prompted Bernard and Stober (1989) to suggest that the 
relative information content of cash flows and accruals may be determined by certain
contexts, or circumstances.^ Thus later studies examine the information content of cash 
flows relative to accruals within several specific contexts. However. Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995, 693) illustrate that "an incremental dollar o f cash earnings is worth less than an 
incremental dollar o f non-cash eamings if, and only if, the accounting (for operating 
assets) is conservative." For unbiased accounting systems, their model provides no 
distinction between cash and accrual eamings.
This study examines whether there is differential information content o f accruals 
relative to cash flows associated with the contextual factor o f conservatism. A measure 
o f conservatism is developed, and observations are partitioned based on their 
conservatism 'score.' A returns model, derived from the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
framework, is estimated to measure the information content o f cash flows and accruals. 
The difference in the information content o f accruals relative to cash flows is assessed for 
firms exhibiting a  high versus a low degree of conservatism. In general, evidence 
supports the theory presented by Feltham and Ohlson (1995).
The remainder o f  this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a 
literature review, theory is discussed in section 3 and hypothesis development is 
explained in section 4. Methodology and descriptive statistics are presented in section 5, 
hypothesis testing and main results are shown in section 6 , sensitivity analyses are in 
section 7 and section 8 contains concluding remarks.
^Bernard and Stober (1989) did not empirically identify any particular context that gives rise to a 
differential information content o f  cash flows and accruals.
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The topics o f  conservatism and the relative information content o f cash flows and 
accruals will be discussed in turn.
2.1 Conservatism
The conservatism constraint for accounting has been in existence since before the 
turn o f  the century. In general, “conservatism is broadly identified with aggressive 
expense recognition and less than aggressive revenue recognition,” Demski (1993, 1). 
Ceteris paribus, the presence o f  conservatism results in lower net income and asset values 
thus facilitating the contracting role of accounting numbers. For instance, “a stated 
function o f the accoimtant’s conservatism was to offset the manager’s optimism 
(presumably encouraged by eamings-based compensation plans),” Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986, 206). Kinney (1993, 2) asserts that “disclosure o f only loss contingencies . . .  may 
lie in the historical role of accounting numbers to facilitate contracts . . . ,  as a means o f 
controlling bias o f optimism o f preparers/asserters . . . ” Yet the purpose o f financial 
reporting is not limited to facilitating contracts.
The objectives o f financial reporting include meeting the information needs o f 
investors as well. By understating income and the book value o f  assets, conservative 
reporting represents a  trade off between the two primary qualitative characteristics o f 
accounting, relevance and reliability. For example, an increase in the market value o f 
fixed assets may be useful information to investors when determining security prices. If 
this increase were immediately recognized, the information would be provided in a timely
manner and allow for a potentially more accurate prediction o f future cash flows. Hence 
the information would be relevant. Yet an estimate o f  the increase in value may not be 
objective, or verifiable. Accordingly, recognition will be deferred until the occurrence of 
an objective, verifiable event allowing a  more ‘reliable’ amount to be reported in the 
financial statements.
Although conservatism trades o ff relevance for reliability, in an efficient market 
investors should be able to assess the conservatism inherent in financial statements when 
they set security prices (Brennan, 1993). Prior literature addresses the value relevance of 
items not maintained in the financial statements due to the trade-off between relevance 
and reliability. For instance Lev and Sougiannis (1996) and Hirschey and Weygandt 
(1985) find a  relation between Research and Development (R&D) expenditures and stock 
price. Deng and Lev (1998) provide evidence that investors ‘undo’ the immediate 
expensing o f acquired R&D. Barth, Clement, Foster and Kasznik (1998) show that brand 
value estimates provide significant explanatory power for stock prices and returns 
incremental to advertising expenses. This research demonstrates that investors do weigh 
items not recognized in the financial statements when determining price.
Prior literature also examines whether investors appear to distinguish between 
differing degrees o f conservatism resulting firom alternative accounting procedures.
Harris and Ohlson (1987) find that firms using the successful efforts (SE) method for 
exploration and development expenditures have a higher market-to-book ratio than firms 
using the full cost (FC) method. Bandyopadhyay (1994) shows that investors’ reaction to
the eamings announcement o f SE firms is greater than that to FC firms/ When looking 
at inventory and depreciation methods, Salamon and Kopel (1993) also conclude that 
investors attach a higher value to eamings when more conservative accounting methods 
are employed.
Basu (1997) finds that investor reaction is greater to good news than to bad news 
in reported eamings. He attributes his result to conservatism’s asymmetric effect on the 
timeliness and persistence o f eamings; bad news is recognized immediately whereas good 
news is deferred and/or only partially recognized. Overall, prior evidence suggests that 
conservatism impacts firm value; implying that investors consider inherent conservatism 
when setting security prices.
2J2 Cash Flows and Accruals
Within this section, the existing literature will be partitioned according to whether 
or not contextual factors are considered.
2.2.1 Studies Not Considering Contextual Factors
The primary focus of earlier studies is to assess whether both cash flows and 
accruals are informative to investors. Informativeness is inferred for a component o f net 
income when a retums-eamings relation results in a  nonzero multiple on that component. 
Evidence indicates that both cash flows and accruals are informative (Bowen, Burgstahler
^However, Bryant (1999) uses a within firm design and finds no difference between the value 
relevance o f  full cost and successful efforts eamings.
and Daley 1987, Rayburn 1986, and Wilson 1986 and 1987)/ Yet, there are mixed 
results regarding the relative weights, or multiples, investors seem to put on accruals 
versus cash flows. For example, Patell and Kaplan (1977) find liiat investors appear to 
assign equal weights to cash flows and accruals while evidence presented in Bowen, 
Burgstahler and Daley (1987) suggests that investors place more weight on cash flows 
than accruals.
Wilson (1986) finds that both cash flows and total accruals are weighted more 
heavily than eamings as a whole and, that more weight is placed on total accruals than on 
cash flows. In an attempt to replicate Wilson's (1987) work, Bernard and Stober (1989) 
find that the results do not generalize to time periods other than those reported in Wilson's 
(1987) study.^ Accordingly, Bernard and Stober (1989) abandon the assumption that the 
informativeness o f cash flows and accruals is consistent across firms and time.
2.2.2 Studies Considering Contextual Factors
Bernard and Stober (1989) seek a relation describing the relative information 
content o f cash flows and accruals that is robust to alternative time periods. They look to 
explanations such as macroeconomic conditions (interest rates and GNP growth), firm 
size and the composition o f current accruals. Insignificant associations between these 
factors and the information content o f cash flows and accruals lead them to conclude that
^Cites are not intended to be exhaustive.
^Bernard and Stober attempted to replicate Wilson's (1987) results indicating a  more favorable 
response the larger (smaller) are cash flows (current accruals).
(1989,648) "differences in the valuation implications o f cash flows and the various 
accrual accounts are more contextual than any o f  the models examined here."
Since Bernard and Stober (1989), the information content of cash flows and 
accruals has been examined in light o f several contextual factors. One of those factors is 
the persistence o f eamings and/or its components. Ali (1994) provides evidence o f a 
positive association between the persistence o f eamings, working capital from operations 
and cash flows and their respective information content. His measure for persistence uses 
the absolute change in the variable o f interest. Cheng, Liu and Schaefer (1996) examine 
the incremental information content o f cash flows within the context of earnings 
persistence. Their evidence suggests that as the persistence of eamings decreases, the 
incremental information content o f cash flows increases.
Contextual factors are not limited to persistence.^ Dechow (1994) identifies 
situations where cash flows are expected to suffer from timing and matching difficulties, 
thus inhibiting their ability to reflect firm performance. These instances are (1) the length 
of the performance measurement interval, (2 ) the volatility of working capital 
requirements and investing and financing activities, and (3) the length o f the firm's 
operating cycle. Dechow (1994) finds that accruals are more informative in situations 
where these three factors constrain the ability o f  cash flows to reflect firm performance. 
Black (1998) finds that the information content o f  various components o f  cash flows is 
associated with a firm's life-cycle stage.
^When demonstrating the difTerence between incremental and relative information content, Biddle, 
Seow and Siegel (1995) compare the information content o f  operating cash flows, net income and net sales 
for selected industries. They find that relative and incremental information content varies between 
industries. Yet since industries are used for 'illustrative purposes,' the authors do not hypothesize which 
variables are expected to possess greater information content.
2.23 Conservatism as a Contextual Factor
The purpose o f  this paper is to investigate conservatism as a potential contextual 
factor. While no published study directly examines this factor, Basu’s (1997) study of 
how conservatism affects the information content of total eamings bears some relation to 
the current paper. Basu (1997) discusses conservatism in terms o f  the asymmetric 
accounting treatment for good and bad news and uses the requirements o f SFAS #121 to 
illustrate the asymmetry. When the book value of an asset exceeds its market value,
SFAS #121 requires the asset to be written down immediately to reflect all of the ‘bad 
news.’ Conversely, if  an asset’s fair market value exceeds its book value, the ‘good news' 
is not recognized immediately; instead, the good news seeps into eamings as the 
undervalued asset produces large revenues and low depreciation expenses. Basu (1997) 
asserts that this asymmetric accounting treatment results in transitory accruals which 
render the accrual portion o f current period’s eamings less persistent for bad news. He 
shows that the ERG is lower for bad news eamings relative to good news eamings and 
that this appears to be attributable to the response coefficient associated with accruals, not 
cash flows.
Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) prediction of a higher retum response to accruals is 
based on conservatism in recording operating assets. Initially, Basu’s (1997) prediction 
that conservatism leads to a lower ERG for bad news appears contradictory. But notice 
that in Basu’s (1997) example, good news leads to an asset being recorded at less than its 
market value whereas bad news results in the asset reflecting its market value. Thus Basu 
(1997) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) both predict a higher ERG in situations where 
operating assets are recorded conservatively.
Both Basu (1997) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) predict higher ER.Cs for 
conservatively recorded assets. However, only Feltham and Ohlson (1995) allow for a- 
priori predictions regarding the relative information content of cash flows and accruals; 
thus I use their framework. A more detailed discussion o f their model follows.
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CHAPTERS
THEORY
Within this section the implications of the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation 
model for the differential information content of cash flows and accruals will be 
discussed. This is followed by the derivation o f a returns model which isolates the effect 
of conservatism on the differential response to operating accruals.
3.1 Feltham and Ohlson (1995)
Current market value is modeled as book value plus the present value o f expected 
abnormal eamings. A firm's book value (bv) is the sum of its book values for net 
operating assets (oa) and net financial assets (fa) such that bv = oa + fa. Expected 
abnormal eamings are expected eamings less expected 'normal eamings.' Expected 
eamings can be described as the expected rate of retum on the fair market value o f a 
firm's assets whereas expected 'normal eamings' represents the interest charge on the 
book value of a firm's assets. Feltham and Ohlson (1995,694) also assume “ ...A  flat, 
non-stochastic, term-stmcture on interest rates...,” and that the expected return on net 
assets is equal to the interest charge. Therefore if book value is equal to market value, 
expected abnormal eamings are zero.
The book values o f  financial assets (eg. marketable securities and bonds payable) 
are presumed to approximate their fair market values implying that expected abnormal 
eamings from financial assets are zero. In contrast, the book values o f operating assets 
are presumed to be less than or equal to their fair market values. Thus operating assets 
may be expected to generate future abnormal eamings. The magnitude of those abnormal
II
eamings is determined in part by the gap between fair market and book values. This gap 
can be influenced by accounting conservatism; for example, the lower o f cost or market 
rule and alternative inventory cost flow assumptions. Hence the degree o f conservatism 
in recording operating assets can influence the magnitude of expected abnormal eamings.
Accordingly, when modeling a firm’s current market value (PJ as current book 
value (bv,) plus expected abnormal eamings, Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) proposition (3) 
allows for the influence o f conservatism in recording operating assets. In essence, 
expected abnormal eamings are derived from two sources; the persistence (aO of current- 
period abnormal operating eamings (ox*,) and an adjustment for the conservatism (ai) in 
recording operating assets in place (oa,).^ Expected abnormal eamings also stem from 
some multiple (P) o f current non-accoimting information (v,):
P, =bv, + aiox*, + a2oat + p*vt (1)
Using the model expressed in equation (1) along with some additional assumptions, 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) show that a firm's market value is expected to change by 1 + 
tti for a dollar of cash flows and by 1 + a i + a% for a dollar o f accruals. Cash flow refers 
to operating plus investing cash flows. The premise is that the retum response associated 
with a dollar o f eamings is a function o f whether the dollar is associated with a change in 
financial or operating assets. In their model, cash flows give rise to financial assets
 ^Where a ,  = S),, /  (Rf-6 ),,) and « 2 = 5>,2Rf /  (Rf-&,,)( Rf- 6)22); 2)ii is the persistence o f  abnormal 
eamings, 5),2 is conservatism and 5>22 is the growth in operating assets. Persistence is the main effect for a ,  
and is also contained in the denominator o f  0 2 . Conservatism is the main effect for 0 2  meaning that neither 
persistence nor growth can affect « 2  if  eamings are unbiased (e.g. S),2  = 0). The reader is referred to 
Appendix 1 for a more detailed explanation.
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whereas operating accruals give rise to operating assets.* Since current-period cash flows 
affect financial assets, they are not expected to generate abnormal eamings. Thus one 
dollar in current-period cash flows is worth one dollar plus an adjustment for persistence 
(tti).
In contrast to cash flows, current-period accruals affect operating assets. The 
market uses the conservatism in beginning-of-period operating assets to form 
expectations for future abnormal eamings. When operating assets are recorded 
conservatively, positive accruals result in an increase in expected abnormal eamings.
This increase is reflected in price via a.2, the additional multiplier to accruals for 
conservatism. However, negative accruals imply that some abnormal eamings 
opportunities attributable to conservatism have been lost, implying a greater decrease in 
price due to the adjustment for conservatism. Accordingly, Feltham and Ohlson (1995, 
718) conclude "the more conservative the accounting the greater is the multiple 
associated with accmed eamings."
3.2 Returns Model
To examine the implications o f cash flows and accruals for the change in a firm's 
market value, I will use several o f Feltham and Ohlson's (1995) assumptions. Those 
assumptions are:
( 1) clean surplus, bv, = bvt.i + Xt - dt
(2 ) the operating asset relation, oa, =  oa,., + ox, - c,
(3) abnormal eamings are defined as x% = x, - [bv,.,*(Rr- I)]
*The operating asset relation states that oa, = oa,., + ox, - c, where oa. ox and c represent operating 
assets, operating eamings and cash flows respectively. The financial asset relation states that fa, = fa,., * i, 
+ c, - d, where fa, i and d represent financial assets, interest and dividends respectively.
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(4) the net interest relation, it = (Rf-l)fat.i, which also specifies a flat, non­
stochastic term structure for interest rates and an equality between book 
and market values for financial assets (1995, 694)
(5) from the net interest relation, = ox \ where o x \ is abnormal 
operating eamings, defined as ox, - [oa,.i*(Rf- 1)]
bv, and oa, are as previously defined; d,= dividends in period t; x,= total eamings in
period t; c, = cash flows in period t; i,= interest income in period t; and Rf= the risk-free
rate plus one. Operating eamings, ox,, consist of operating accmals and cash flows while
total eamings, x,, encompass eamings from operating and financial activities.
Taking the one-period change for equation (1) and making the appropriate
substitutions yields:
P, - P,.| = X, - d, + tti {[x, - bv,.,*(Rf- 1)1 - [xt-i - bv,.2*(Rf- I )] }+
t t 2(OX, -  c ,)  +  P(v, -  v ,.i) (2 )
Based on equation (2), tt2 (conservatism) is associated with the level of current-period
operating accruals, (oac,= ox, - c,). Rearranging terms, and deflating all variables by
beginning-of-period market value, P,.i, allows equation (2) to be expressed in a returns
framework as follows:’’*®
Ret, = 00 + 8 |X , + 02Ax, - 03(Abv,.i) + 04oac, + e, (3 )
1987).
^Deflating by beginning-of-period price also reduces spurious correlation related to size (Christie
'®Ohison (1995,668) defines v as value-relevant information that is independent from current and 
past eamings. K is unobservable and while some correlation between v and conservatism is possible, since v 
is by definition uncorrelated with current and past eamings, excluding v from equation (3) does not induce 
bias on the coeffiecients being tested (Gujarati 1994,457).
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For the sake o f parsimony, firm-specific subscripts and the deflator, P,_, are not shown.” 
Comparing equations (2) and (3) shows that 8 , is expected to be 02 provides an 
empirical estimate o f  cc, (persistence); 63 is a function o f a , multiplied by Rf- 1; e, 
represents other information; and 84 is a measure o f (conservatism). Thus, 84 is an 
empirical measure o f  the differential response to operating accruals relative to operating 
cash flows.
”  Variable definitions are as follows; x is eamings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations, compustat data item #18; bv is book value, compustat data item #60; oac is operating accruals, 
[A total assets - A cash and short-term securities - A investments and advances, equity method and other] - 
[A total liabilities - A short-term debt in current liabilities - A long-term debt]; compustat data items [A#6 - 
A#I - A#31 - A#32] -  [A#181 - A#34 - A#9]. Ret is returns, defined as market-adjusted returns cumulated 
over the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year end. Because market-wide returns have 
a  low association with eamings (Dechow 1994, 13), removing that portion of returns may improve the 
power o f  the tests. Overall results are similar whether using raw returns, o r the value or equal-weighted 
market adjustments. Reported results use the equal-weighted market adjustment.
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The influence o f conservatism can be seen within Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Some examples are the historical cost principle and the expensing of 
research and development costs. Since conservatism is a stated constraint for GAAP, 
corporate accounting practice in the United States may be expected to exhibit overall 
conservatism. For this reason, operating accruals are expected to possess differential 
information content (64) relative to cash flows. The following hypothesis regarding a 
cross-section of sample firms is stated in its null and alternative forms:
Hio: The market’s valuation o f  operating accruals is less than or equal to that of
cash flows (04 < 0 in equation 3).
Hi a: The market’s valuation o f  operating accruals is greater than that o f cash 
flows (04 > 0 in equation 3).
Although GAAP places boimdaries on accounting practice, a firm still has a host 
o f available options that may increase or decrease its degree of conservatism.'^ These 
options may take the form o f accounting method choices as well as other business 
decisions.'^ One example o f an accounting method choice is the alternative inventory 
cost flow assumptions o f FIFO and LIFO. Other business decisions affecting a firm’s 
degree o f conservatism include investments in items that GAAP records at less than fair
'^Managers' discretion for choosing a  firm's overall conservatism could provide a signal about that 
firm's future (earnings) prospects. Hence the underlying economic structure for the retum-eamings relation 
may include signaling. Since managers could use their discretion in either an opportunistic or an efficient 
manner, it is unclear whether a  given level o f conservatism signals positive or negative future economic 
prospects. In the absence o f  a clear theory o f signaling via conservatism, I assume that positive and 
negative signals are randomly distributed across conservatism partitions, and thus I rely on equation (3) as 
the reduced form of the underlying economic model.
'^Feltham and Ohlson ( 1995) do not discriminate between alternative sources o f  conservatism such 
as mandated accounting methods and managerial discretion. This distinction may provide avenues for 
future research.
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market value such as research and development or advertising. The multitude of 
accounting choices and business decisions a firm makes may consist o f some more 
conservative and some less conservative alternatives (Salamon and Kopel 1993,
Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979). Thus conservatism exists on a continuum with its 
available range constrained by existing accounting standards and concepts.
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) show that the differential information content of 
accruals relative to cash flows is increasing in conservatism. This implies that increases 
in the degree o f  conservatism will be associated with increases in 84, the differential 
information content o f  accruals. To test for this effect, I compute a measure o f the 
relative amount o f conservatism for each firm-year observation. However, my 
conservatism score will likely contain noise making it difficult to observe the expected 
monotonie relation. A more statistically powerful test excludes firms exhibiting a 
medium degree o f conservatism and compares the differential response to operating 
accruals, 84, between firms with high versus low conservatism. I predict that 84 will be 
greater for firms displaying high' conservatism. Hypothesis 2 in its null and alternative 
forms follows:
H20: The differential information content o f accruals relative to cash flows [84
from equation (3)] for firms exhibiting a "high" degree o f conservatism is 
expected to be less than or equal to that o f  firms exhibiting a 'low* degree 
o f conservatism.
H2A: The differential information content o f accruals relative to cash flows [84
firom equation (3)] for firms exhibiting a 'high' degree o f conservatism is 
expected to be greater than that of firms exhibiting a 'low* degree of 
conservatism.
Hypothesis 2 does not consider the relation between the conservatism score and 84 
for firms exhibiting a  'medium' degree o f conservatism. Since Feltham and Ohlson's
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(1995) assertion applies to all degrees o f  conservatism, a stronger test o f  the theory will 
test for a positive association between the conservatism score and the differential 
information content o f accruals over cash flows across all firms. Hypothesis 3 is stated in 
its null and alternative forms as follows:
H30: The association between the differential information content o f accruals
relative to cash flows [04 from equation (3)] and the conservatism score is 
expected to zero or negative.
H ja.: The association between the differential information content o f accruals
relative to cash flows [64 from equation (3)] and the conservatism score is 
expected to be positive.
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CHAPTERS
METHODOLOGY
Sample selection, the conservatism score and descriptive statistics will be 
discussed in tum.
5.1 Sample Selection
To be included in the sample, firms must have sufficient financial statement and 
returns data on Compustat and CRSP so that a conservatism score can be computed and 
model (3) can be estimated. Since the going-concem assumption implicit within the 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model may be violated in loss situations (Hayn, 1995), firms 
with current-period losses are excluded from the sample.*”*
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) use a residual income model for specifying earnings. 
Negative book values imply negative expected earnings, which are not consistent with the 
going concern assumption. Negative book values also create difficulty for interpreting 
market-to-book ratios. For these reasons, firm-year observations with a negative book 
value are deleted. To avoid potential Compustat data measurement errors induced by a 
change in fiscal year end, the year o f the change is excluded. These criteria result in a 
sample of 3,825 firm-year observations representing fifty-five 2-digit SIC codes over the 
years 1975 through 1996.
Descriptive statistics for the sample are shown in table 1. The means o f market 
and book value o f equity are 587.89 and 286.92 million, respectively. There appears to
'^Results are sensitive to the inclusion o f  losses, consistent with Hayn’s (1995) findings that losses 
are valued differently from profits.
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be a bias toward larger firms although comparison o f  the mean and median values also 
indicates that there are extreme observations. For completeness, descriptive statistics on 
market-to-book, net operating assets, earnings, abnormal operating earnings, raw returns 
and the conservatism score are also included in table 1. To the extent that results are 
related to sampling criteria and/or data requirements necessary for model estimation and 
building a conservatism score, findings may not generalize to the entire population o f 
firms.
5,2 Conservatism
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define accounting conservatism as recording 
operating assets at something less than their market values. An ideal conservatism score 
would accurately measure the difference between the market values and the recorded 
values o f operating assets, but such a measure is not feasible. Fortunately, a proxy that 
captures the relative magnitude of conservatism across firms is sufficient to empirically 
test Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) theory o f a link between conservatism and the 
differential return response to operating accruals.
The conservatism score should reflect the unrecorded portion o f a firm’s operating 
assets, relative to other firms. For some operating assets, sufficient data are available so 
that their unrecorded values can be directly estimated. One example is inventory. In 
general, firms that use the LIFO cost-flow assumption report a  lower book value for 
inventory than under alternative assumptions such as FIFO or average cost. When firms 
use LIFO, they disclose the difference between the inventory value computed under LIFO 
and an alternative cost flow assumption in the footnotes as the LIFO reserve. Thus the 
LIFO reserve represents the unrecorded inventory asset.
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The LIFO inventory cost-flow assumption is one o f many circumstances in which 
a firm may understate its recorded assets relative to other firms. Other examples are 
investments in research and development and advertising, provisions made for the 
allowance for doubtful accounts, assumptions regarding the life o f  long-term assets and 
unrecorded gains and losses on pension plan assets. These items are considered because 
they can be estimated firom financial statement data and may result in differential 
unrecorded asset values across firms.
5.2.1 Estimating the Conservatism Score Components
The contribution o f each o f the aforementioned items to a  firm’s relative degree of 
conservatism will be discussed in tum.
5.2.1.1 Unrecorded Inventory Asset
If  prices have risen in the past, the LIFO cost-flow assumption results in a lower 
recorded value for inventory than alternative cost-flow assumptions such as first-in-first- 
out (FIFO) and average cost. Even though increasing prices are necessary for LIFO to 
result in an unrecorded asset, the LIFO assumption is considered to be conservative 
relative to the alternative cost-flow assumptions. For instance Salamon and Kopel 
(1993), Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981) and Pincus (1991) all consider the LIFO cost- 
flow assumption to represent a conservative accoimting choice.'^ Firms that use the LIFO 
cost-flow assumption are required to report a LIFO reserve. This is measured as the
Within the current sample, 1457 firm-year observations show a LIFO reserve. O f those 
observations, 1448 are greater than zero lending empirical support to the notion that on average, the LIFO 
cost-flow assumption represents a more conservative accounting choice.
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difference between the recorded inventory values using LIFO and an alternative cost-flow 
assumption. The LIFO reserve amount is available on Compustat as data item #240 and 
is used to estimate the unrecorded inventory asset.
5.2.1.2 Unrecorded Research and Development Asset
In general, current accounting standards require outlays for R&D to be 
immediately expensed, resulting in an amortization rate o f 100% for the related assets.
To the extent that the expenditure provides a future economic benefit, an unrecorded 
intangible asset results. Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) and Bubblitz and Ettredge (1989) 
provide evidence that there are expected future economic benefits associated with 
investments in R&D. In addition to their findings substantiating R&D’s future economic 
benefit. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) also estimate economic amortization rates for R&D 
expenditures by 2-digit SIC code. To the extent that the economic amortization rate 
and/or the outlay for R&D differ across firms, so do the unrecorded assets related to 
R&D. Thus R&D expenditures potentially contribute to cross-firm differences in 
conservatism.
Lev and Sougiannis’ (1996, 121) economic amortization rates, 5, and useful lives, 
T, can be used to estimate the unrecorded asset resulting from R&D expenditures as 
follows:
Ty 5k(R&Dt.k) (4)
R)
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where t is the current period and k is the k*** prior period. Thus R&D,_k is research and 
development expense (Compustat data item #46) for the k* lag. 5k is a fraction 
representing the imamortized percentage o f  the k* lag’s (0 . . .  T) R&D expenditures.
Using equation (4) to directly estimate the unrecorded R&D asset would be my 
first choice if  lagged R&D data were readily available. However, requiring non-missing 
lags causes large reductions in sample size and eliminates certain industries. Thus, I use 
an alternative measure that takes the current level o f R&D spending and ‘‘grosses it up” 
based on the industry-specific ô’s and expenditure growth rates. Sensitivity analysis 
presented below for the firms with complete data suggest that (4) and the “gross-up” 
method produce similar mean amounts o f  unrecorded R&D assets, and the rank 
correlations between the two measures are very close to l.O.
5 .2 .0  Unrecorded Advertising Asset
Outlays for advertising are also immediately expensed, and to the extent that the 
advertising expenditures provide future economic benefits, an unrecorded intangible asset 
results. Hirschey and Weygandt (1985), Bubblitz and Ettredge (1989) and Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996) show that there are expected future benefits arising from current- 
period advertising expenditures. Hirschey and Weygandt (1985, 333) provide economic 
amortization rates for advertising expenditures based on whether the firm is a member o f 
a durable versus a nondurable goods industry.
Hirschey and Weygandt’s (1985, 333) economic amortization rates, 5, and useful 
lives, T, are used to estimate the unrecorded asset resulting from advertising expenditures 
as follows:
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^  5k(ADVt.k) (5)
where t is the current period and k is the k*** prior period. Thus ADV[.k is advertising 
expense (Compustat data item #45) for the k* lag. Ôk is a fraction representing the 
unamortized percentage o f  the k* lag’s (0 . . .  T) advertising expenditures. As with R&D, 
using equation (5) to directly measure the unrecorded advertising asset would be my 
preference if  data were readily available.
5.2.1.4 Unrecorded Gains or Losses on Pension Plan Assets
Pension Plan Assets consist primarily of stocks and bonds and would normally be 
considered financial assets. However, a firm’s management has discretion when 
estimating an expected rate o f return on those assets, and in general, the difference 
between the expected and the actual rate o f return is not immediately recognized in the 
financial statements. This creates a current-period difference between the fair value and 
book value o f  pension assets equal to the difference between the expected and the actual 
rate of return multiplied by the pension plan assets. The cumulation of these differences 
represents the unrecorded portion of pension plan assets. This unrecorded pension asset 
may vary among firms and thus contribute to differences in overall conservatism.
The unrecognized gain or loss on pension plan assets attributable to the current 
year is measured as the difference between the total actual return and the total expected 
return on pension plan assets. The total actual return on pension plan assets is Compustat 
data item #333 while the expected return is defined as underfunded plus overfunded 
pension plan assets, Compustat data items #296 and #287, multiplied by the anticipated
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long-term rate o f  return, Compustat data item #336. Since this unrecorded asset is 
cumulative, it is cumulated over all available years.
5.2.1.5 Unrecorded Accounts Receivable Asset
Firms are allowed some discretion when estimating their uncollectible accounts 
receivable. Because the accounts receivable asset is reported net o f the estimated 
uncollectible amounts, the proportion of receivables shown as an asset may vary across 
firms. When firms face similar circumstances regarding account collectibility, the firm 
reporting the lower net percentage o f receivables has created an unrecorded asset 
contributing to its conservatism.
The unrecorded asset is measured as the difference between the actual 
allowance, Compustat data item #67, and a firm-specific minimum allowance.
A firm’s minimiun allowance is obtained by multiplying the firm’s gross receivables by 
an industry-based minimum percentage.’® This industry-based minimum percentage is 
defined as the lowest ratio o f the allowance for uncollectible accoimts to gross receivables 
within that industry for period t, as follows:
.^^Allowance Receivables j..)
where industry J  is defined by its two-digit SIC code.
Within an industry, there may be a  divergence of credit policies. As the credit 
policy becomes more lenient, the portion o f net sales outstanding would be expected to 
increase. Thus a  divergence in credit policies may be reflected in days’ sales in
Gross receivables are computed as the sum o f  the allowance for uncollectible accounts and net 
receivables; Compustat data items tl67 +- #2.
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receivables.*’ To accommodate credit policy differences, the industry-based minimum 
allowance percentage is adjusted for days’ sales in receivables.
Minj.t
 ^Allowance j . t /  ''
_______ / GrossReceivables j,t
Days’ Sales in Receivables j,t
Days’ Sales in Receivables i,t (7)
Intuitively, a firm having more days’ sales in receivables has a more liberal credit policy 
and probably expects more losses from non-payment. These expected losses are not an 
unrecorded asset. Therefore my measure of the firm’s m in im u m  allowance reflects cross 
industry differences in allowance percentage plus within industry differences in credit 
policy. The firm’s minimum allowance is computed by multiplying firm /’s gross 
receivables by the firm-specific minimum percentage requirement from equation (7). The 
difference between a firm’s actual allowance and its required m in im um  allowance 
represents the unrecorded asset associated with accounts receivable.
5.2.1.6 Unrecorded Depreciation Asset
Relative differences in accounting conservatism may also result from differences 
in the assumed useful life for depreciable assets. Ceteris paribus, at any point during an 
asset’s useful life, accumulated depreciation will be lower when a longer useful life is 
assumed. This results in higher book values for assets when firms opt to assume longer 
useful lives. In contrast, firms that opt for shorter asset lives will report lower book 
values resulting from a  higher balance in accumulated depreciation.
Days’ sales in receivables is computed as gross receivables divided by sales per day; Compustat 
data items [(#2 + #67) /  (#12/360)).
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Accordingly, the unrecorded depreciation asset will be measured as a firm’s 
accumulated depreciation in excess o f the accumulated depreciation that would have been 
recorded if  an industry-based maximum asset life were assumed. This industry-based 
benchmark is computed for each 2-digit SIC code, for each year. To obtain a firm’s 
unrecorded depreciation asset, it is first helpful to determine the excess depreciation a 
firm has taken in percentage terms. This is done as follows:
/
1 - Average Life o f Assets
c( Average Life o f Assets j.t). (8)
where the average life o f  assets is gross property plant & equipment divided by 
depreciation expense [Compustat data items (#7) / ( #103)] for firm / (industry j) , period 
t. The balance in firm /’s accumulated depreciation account for period t is then multiplied 
by the appropriate excess depreciation percentage, yielding the unrecorded depreciation 
asset. This computation is only valid for firms using the straight-line method for 
depreciation. Thus, to include this item in the conservatism score, the sample is limited 
to firms that use straight-line depreciation.
5.2.2 Adjustments to the Score
Adjustments are made to facilitate comparison among firms’ overall degrees of 
conservatism. First, since score components are measured in total dollars 1 use a scaling 
convention. Second, grossing up the unrecorded R&D and advertising assets provides for 
comparisons between firm-years with and without all lagged data. Both of these 
adjustments are discussed in tum.
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5.2.2.1 Scaling Convention
Recall that Feltham and Ohlson’s (1995) definition o f conservatism is based on 
the disparity between the book and market values o f operating assets. My conservatism 
score proxies for the difference between market and book values by estimating the 
unrecorded value o f firms’ operating assets. Since a  firm’s degree of conservatism is 
related to how its operating assets are recorded, I scale the sum of a firm’s conservatism 
score components by its recorded net operating assets. This gives a conservatism score 
that is a ratio o f a firm’s unrecorded operating assets to its recorded net operating assets.
5.2.2.2 Comparing Alternative Weights for R&D and Advertising Expenditures
The unrecorded R&D and advertising assets are the sum of the unamortized 
portions o f R&D and advertising expenditures made over the asset’s economic life. Thus 
estimating R&D and advertising assets may require all relevant expenditure data for as 
many as seven prior years, depending on the firm’s industry membership. Table 2 shows 
how such a stringent data requirement can reduce the sample size. Before imposing data 
requirements for the remaining score components, excluding firms without complete 
expenditure data reduces the available sample from 11,942 to 7,504 and 9,434 to 1,684 
for the R&D and advertising assets, respectively. Table 2 also provides evidence that the 
loss o f  observations is not evenly distributed across industries. The number o f two-digit 
SIC codes having nonzero expenditure data is reduced from 53 to 42 for the R&D asset 
and from 62 to 36 for the advertising asset. Thus the more restrictive data requirements 
would not only reduce the available sample but would also exclude certain industries.
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I could use only current-period expenditures for R&D and advertising in my 
estimate o f relative conservatism. Table 2 shows that when including only current-period 
expenditures, the magnitudes o f  these assets are less than forty percent of their 
magnitudes when all relevant years’ expenditures are included. This suggests that 
including only current-period expenditures may understate the contribution o f R&D and 
advertising expenditures to a  firm’s overall conservatism score.
1 try several alternatives to preserve data points and to maintain an appropriate 
weighting of R&D and advertising within the conservatism score. The first alternative is 
to include actual expenditures for all available periods and to assume expenditures o f zero 
when an observation is missing. The second is to assume that expenditures are constant 
firom year-to-year. The third alternative is to estimate a growth rate for these 
expenditures, on an industry basis, then use the growth rate and current-period
expenditures to estimate prior years’ expenditures as follows:
/ \
Expenditures nLag i.„ (9)
( 1 + growthj)"
where lag i n is the estimated expenditure for firm /, for the n ** prior period. The 
subscript t denotes the current-period and j  represents firm i’s two-digit SIC code.
Estimates using each o f the three alternatives are shown in table 2. For the sample 
o f  firm-year observations having no missing data for prior-period expenditures, the 
estimate employing all available periods provides a reasonable benchmark for the 
unrecorded R&D and advertising assets. This mean estimate is 0.267 for R&D and 0.461 
for advertising. The mean (median) annual growth rate for R&D expenditures is 0.328 
(0.121) and 0.332 (0.108) for advertising. The positive growth rates indicate overall
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increasing expenditures during the sample period, and the difference between the means 
and medians indicates positive skewness. The positive outliers are large in magnitude 
providing a mean value approximately three times the median for both R&D and 
advertising expenditures. If the mean values are used to proxy for growth, the effect of 
extreme observations may be to understate the estimated assets. Hence to mitigate the 
potential for understatement o f the R&D and advertising assets, the median values are 
used to proxy for growth rates.’*
Since growth rates are on average positive, assuming that prior-period’s 
expenditures are equal to current-period expenditures tends to overstate the assets. This 
can be seen in table 2 when examining firms with no missing data. The R&D 
(advertising) asset is 0.306 (0.523) when lagged expenditures are assumed equal to 
current-period expenditures versus 0.267 (0.461) when actual data are used.
Incorporating growth provides an estimate o f0.258 (0.429) for R&D (advertising) thus 
alleviating the overstatement and providing a measure closer in magnitude to the value 
obtained using actual data. For firms with missing data, estimating prior-period lags 
provides an asset larger in magnitude than when replacing missing lags with values of 
zero. This is to be expected and provides further arguments in favor of estimating lagged 
R&D and advertising expenditures using current-period expenditures and adjusting for 
growth.
Since the objective o f the conservatism score is to allow firm-year observations to 
be ranked, I compare the relative ranking o f  asset values when using estimates for prior-
'* If  a firm is not publicly traded during the entire growth estimation period. 1 assume that it existed 
as a  private firm for the remainder o f  that period.
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period expenditures versus actual data. For firm-year observations with no missing prior- 
period expenditure data, Spearman rank correlations between asset values obtained from 
estimating prior-period lags while incorporating growth and those obtained from actual 
data are 0.976 for R&D and 0.959 for advertising. Both correlations are positive and 
significantly different ffom zero at the 0 .0 1  level.
Overall, comparing estimates from current-period expenditures adjusted for 
growth with actual data suggests that the estimated values are similar in magnitude and 
preserve the relative ranking of observations. Thus to preserve data points, estimated 
values of prior-period expenditures are used to compute the R&D and advertising assets. 
Descriptive statistics follow.
5.23 Conservatism Score, Descriptive Statistics
For a firm year to be included, the observation is required to have certain 
nonmissing conservatism score data. In Compustat, items with missing values are 
distinguished from items with insignificant or zero values. A firm year having an 
insignificant or zero value for one or more o f the conservatism score components is not 
excluded. For instance, if a firm does not invest in research and development, the 
unrecorded asset related to R&D is entered as zero, and the firm is not excluded from the 
sample. Excluding those firms could potentially add uimecessary bias to the sample via 
excluding industries where R&D investments are infrequent. Since pension gains and 
losses are cumulative and there is no a-priori reason to believe that any year’s gain or loss 
contributes more or less proportionally to the unrecorded asset, I use all available data
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and set missing observations to zero.”  Again, this concession is made to preserve data 
points. Each o f the remaining items is required to have nonmissing current-period data.
Using the residual income model for earnings, negative operating assets implies 
negative expected operating earnings. This appears inconsistent with the going-concem 
assumption presumed by Feltham and Ohlson (1995). Thus firms with negative operating 
assets are also excluded from the sample.
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the 3,825 firm-year observations that 
meet all of the data requirements. The mean (median) conservatism score is 0.536 
(0.392), indicating that the unrecorded portion o f operating assets is 53.6% (39.2%) o f 
recorded operating assets. Overall, the unrecorded R&D, advertising and depreciation 
assets are the largest components o f the conservatism score.
The maximum (minimum) conservatism score is 77.64 (-0.515). The discrepancy 
between the mean and median values o f 0.536 and 0.392 suggests that the maximum 
value may be extreme. A closer examination indicates that the 99* percentile value for 
the conservatism score is 2.573 and the U* percentile value is 0.014. The advertising 
asset ranges from 0 to 55.47 yet the 99* and percentiles are 1.19 and 0, respectively. 
Much o f the difference between the maximum value and the 99* percentile is due to a 
low denominator.^® Several inventory assets were negative. This indicates that, for some
Data for pension gains and losses is not available on Compustat prior to 1991. Subsequent to 
19 9 1 this data is frequently missing and constraining firms to have all data available for pension gains and 
losses after 1991 results in eliminating all firm-year observations from 1991 onward. Pension gains and 
losses differ from R&D and advertising in that their life may be infinite and there is no a priori basis to 
assume a relation between these gains and losses from one year to the next. The contribution o f  pension 
gains and losses is also quite minimal when compared to the other conservatism score components.
The firm-year observation with the largest advertising asset has a denominator value o f 0.032, 
meaning that its net operating assets are 0.032 million. To illustrate the extremity o f this observation, the 
maximum observed value for the advertising asset and the total conservatism score is 21.14 and 21.45 when 
this firm-year is excluded, compared to 77.64 and 55.47 when this firm-year is included.
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firm-years, inventory prices are on average lower than in the prior years when LIFO 
layers were added.
Firm years were allowed to have zero values for some of the conservatism score 
components.^' Table 3 indicates that the unrecorded asset for depreciation is most often 
nonzero (3,716 of the 3,825 firm-year observations). On the other end o f the spectrum, 
information for unexpected gains and losses is available for only 333 firm-year 
observations. This is to be expected since the information for this computation was not 
available on Compustat prior to 1991. The conservatism score items may also vary by 
the nature of a firm’s business and/or by year. Thus, descriptive statistics for the 
conservatism score and its components are shown by industry in table 4 and by year in 
table 5.
5.23.1 Conservatism Score by Industry and Year
Table 4 shows the conservatism score by one-digit SIC code. The average 
conservatism score ranges from a mean (median) o f 0.245 (0.243) for SIC codes 0 to 999 
and 1.235 (0.444) for SIC codes 7000 to 7999. As expected, the components vary by SIC 
code. For instance, the mean advertising asset ranges from .671 for personal and business 
services to 0.012 for other services (social, educational and government). The 
mean R&D asset ranges firom 0.237 for insurance, real estate and investment brokers (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) to 0.004 for wholesale and retail (SIC codes 5000-5999). The R&D
There are 16 firm years with a negative conservatism score and for each o f  these observations, 
unrecorded pension gains and losses is the cause for the negative score. Hence the unrecorded losses on 
pension plan assets exceed the positive impact o f  the other score components. Overall results are not 
sensitive to the exclusion o f  these 16 observations ffom the sample.
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asset for SIC codes 6000-6999 results partially from development o f software for 
providing technology and asset management services." Its magnitude is reflective of 
smaller net operating asset values for SIC codes 6000-6999. resulting in a smaller deflator 
when computing the unrecorded R&D asset.^
Table 5 shows the mean conservatism score and its components by years. The 
mean score and components tend to vary over years as well. Although not monotonie, 
there seems to be an increasing trend in the score. There also appears to be an increasing 
trend in advertising and R&D assets over the years. The differences in the conservatism 
score items and the score itself over years could be a function o f economic and/or 
competitive conditions or simply the industry composition of the sample within those 
years. However, a thorough examination of this issue is beyond the scope o f this paper. 
Tests o f hypotheses follow.
^C om pustat data item #46, Research & Development expenditures includes software costs that are 
capitalized under SFAS #8 6 . Some firms within SIC codes 6000-6999 do capitalize portions o f  their 
software development expenditures. There is no reason to believe that capitalization is unique to these SIC 
codes within the current sample. I am unaware o f  Compustat data items that identify firms which capitalize 
portions o f  their R&D expenditures. Lev & Sougaûmis (1996) also use data item #46 and make no 
adjustments for capitalized software development costs when estimating the unamortized percentages o f 
R&D expenditures. Thus capitalized expenditures are incorporated in the rates used for computing my 
unrecorded R&D asset. Penman & Zheng (1999) also base their unrecorded R&D asset on data item #46 
and Chan, Lakonishok &  Sougiannis (1999) use data-item #46 to proxy for the off-balance sheet amount o f 
R&D spending. Thus my usage o f  data item #46 is also consistent with existing literature.
^ T h e  mean (median) net operating assets are 52.28 (15.36) million for insurance, real estate and 
investment brokers compared to  389.91 (56.93) million for the overall sample.
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CHAPTER 6 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING
The purpose o f this paper is to empirically examine whether there is a differential 
response to accruals relative to cash flows within the context o f accounting conservatism. 
To test this question, a retum-eamings relation derived from Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
is used and firm-year observations are segregated on their relative degrees o f 
conservatism. Tests o f  hypotheses follow.
6.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicts that on average, operating accruals will display differential 
information content over cash flows. This requires the entire sample o f firms to practice 
a sufficient amount o f conservatism. Recall that under Feltham and Ohlson (1995), 
conservatism must be present for the response to operating accruals to differ from the 
response to other components o f  earnings, and 04 captures that difference.
A pooled, cross-sectional time-series model provides a direct test o f hypothesis 1. 
Yet according to Bemard (1987), cross-sectional dependence in the dependent variable 
results in understated OLS standard errors thus overstated t-statistics. To avoid using 
OLS statistics, Bemard (1987) suggests estimating the model on an annual, cross- 
sectional basis and testing the significance o f the mean for the annual coefficients. In a 
similar fashion, I estimate 84 for each o f  the 300 groups o f firm years that aic partitioned
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o n  th e ir  c o n s e rv a tis m  s c o re s  a n d  te s t  w h e th e r  th e  m e a n  o f  th e  e s tim a te d  84 is re lia b ly  
d if fe re n t f fo m  zero.'"* C o m p a re d  to  a n n u a l e s t im a tio n , p a r titio n in g  o n  c o n s e rv a tism  h a s  
th e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  p ro v id in g  m o re  d e g re e s  o f  f re e d o m  fo r  a s se ss in g  p re d ic tio n s  a b o u t 84.
A s  w ith  B e rn a rd 's  m e th o d , I a lso  a v o id  u s in g  O L S  t-s ta tis t ic s .  F o r c o m p a ra tiv e  p u rp o se s , 
I p re s e n t  re su lts  f o r  th e  p o o le d , c ro s s -se c tio n a l e s t im a tio n  a n d  fo r  th e  300 p a r ti tio n s  in  
ta b le  6-
Recall ffom equation (3) that 81 is the return response common to earnings ffom 
both financial and operating activities. The sum, (82 + 83), represents the incremental 
return response to abnormal operating earnings relative to earnings from financial 
activities. The response common to operating accruals and cash flows is (81 + 82 +
83) while 84 captures the additional response to operating accruals. Thus (8 , + 8 2  +  83 +
84) is the return response to operating accruals and (61 + 82 + 83) is the response to 
operating cash flows. In table 6 , results from the pooled, time-series cross-sectional 
specification indicate that the response common to financial and operating earnings is 
1.16 and significantly positive at 0.01. The sum of the coefficients on abnormal operating 
earnings, (82 +  83), is 0.697 and is also significantly greater than zero at 0 .01 This
^^The choice o f 300 partitions is arbitrary however it should allow an acceptable trade off between 
sufficient observations within partitions for estimating equation (3) and a  sufficient number o f  partitions to 
assess correlations in subsequent analyses. This number also provides degrees o f  freedom comparable to 
those afforded when running later sensitivity analyses using a firm-specific design. One alternative is to 
control for the cross-sectional dependence in returns originating fi'om similarities in industry membership 
and in time periods by allowing a separate intercept for each one-digit SIC code and year combination.
This allows more degrees o f  fi-eedom than Bernard's method but may not control for all cross-sectional 
dependence in the dependent variable. A pooled, cross-sectional estimation incorporating separate intercept 
terms gives results and significance levels similar to those from the partitioning method.
“  Results for (B? + 8 3 ) are not shown in table 6 . This analysis was done to examine whether the 
opposite and significant directions o f these two coefficients were offsetting to the point that their sum would 
not be reliably different from zero.
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provides evidence o f a  positive and significant return response to earnings from operating 
and financing activities and, a significantly positive incremental response to abnormal 
operating earnings. Mean coefficients across the 300 partitions suggest a similar 
conclusion.
However, the pooled, cross-sectional specification shows that the coefficient 
representing the differential response to operating accruals relative to operating cash 
flows, 04, is -0.016 and not reliably different ffom zero. The mean 84 coefficient across 
the 300 conservatism partitions is 0.054 and not significantly different ffom zero. Thus 
both tests indicate that the null hypothesis o f zero or negative differential information 
content for operating accruals relative to cash flows cannot be rejected.’^
■* Since 84  does not exhibit significance, overstated OLS t-statistics are not an issue for tests o f 
hypothesis 1. The return response to earnings ffom operating and financial activities, 8 ,, and the 
incremental response to abnormal operating earnings, (Oi + 83) are significantly positive. Thus to provide 
further confidence in results ffom the pooled, time-series cross-sectional method, the model is estimated for 
each conservatism partition. The mean coefficients across partitions for 8 , and (8 ;  + 8 3 ) are 0.683 and 
2.340. Both exhibit positive significance at 0.01. For completeness, the mean 84 is 0.054 and not 
significantly different ffom zero.
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6J, Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 examines whether the differential retnm-response to operating 
accruals is greater for firms exhibiting a "high" versus a 'low* degree of conservatism?’ To 
test hypothesis 2, the 300 partitions are categorized as possessing either ‘high’ or ‘low’ 
conservatism. Partition 300 (I) represents the firms with the highest (lowest) overall 
conservatism scores. Equation (3) is estimated for each of the 300 partitions. Parametric 
and nonparametric tests are used to assess the statistical significance of differences in 84 
for the high versus the low conservatism categories. Both types of tests are performed to 
provide insight as to the robustness o f  results. The middle 100 conservatism partitions 
are included in the first analysis and then excluded to determine if there is statistical 
improvement afforded when only the more extreme conservatism score partitions are 
compared.
Panel B o f table 6  presents results for the Wilcoxon rank sums, medians and 
means tests. When all partitions are included, partitions 151-300 (1-150) represent the 
high (low) conservatism groups. The first column of table 6  shows the Wilcoxon rank 
sums, number of partitions in each category with a median that exceeds the median for all
Referring to equation (3), it may be argued that simultaneity could be a problem when estimating 
the association between the conservatism score and the differential return response to current-period 
operating accruals. This is because current-period operating accruals are included in the conservatism score 
denominator as a component o f  net operating assets. However, I expect current-period operating accruals 
to  be a  small portion o f the overall score because the score is based on data over several years while 
operating accruals are for the current period only. In addition, these variables may contain different 
information sets. Taken together, the potential for simultaneity should be reduced. However, I still 
examine the relation between these two variables. Pearson correlations between current-period operating 
accruals and the conservatism score numerator (unrecorded operating assets) and denominator (net 
operating assets) are 0.340 and 0.473, respectively. Both correlations are significant at the 0 .0 1 level. This 
is likely to be the result o f  scale. However, when examining the relation between the entire conservatism 
score and current-period operating accruals, the correlation o f  -0.003 is not significantly different ffom zero 
a t the O.IO level. This correlation also indicates that the regression. Conservatism Score = bp + b,Operating 
Accruals, gives a b, coefficient that is not significantly different ffom zero at 0 .10. Thus simultaneity is not 
examined further.
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300 partitions and the means for the upper and lower partitions. The mean 64 for the 
upper (lower) partitions is 0.192 (-0.084) and is significantly greater for the high 
conservatism group at the 0.05 level. The test o f medians shows that o f the ISO upper 
(lower) partitions, 87 (63) partitions exhibited a 6 4  coefficient above the median. The 
medians test indicates that the number of upper partitions with a  median above the 
sample median is significantly greater than that for the lower partitions, at the 0.01  level. 
The overall median, not reported, for the upper (lower) partitions is 0.174 (-0.076) 
compared to the sample median o f  0.025. The Wilcoxon rank sums test also provides 
evidence that 8 4  is on average larger (smaller) for the upper (lower) partitions at the 0.01 
level of significance.
Because 64 is expected to increase in conservatism, removing the middle 100 
partitions and comparing the highest and lowest one-third o f the partitions should result 
in differences that are at least equal to those when the middle partitions are included. The 
second column o f  table 6 , panel B shows results for the Wilcoxon, medians and means 
tests when the middle partitions are excluded. The mean 84 for the upper and lower 100 
conservatism partitions is 0.269 and -0.004, respectively. The mean for the upper 
partitions is significantly greater than the mean for the lower partitions at the 0.05 level. 
Removing the middle partitions results in a magnitude for the difference in means that is 
approximately equal to the magnitude when all partitions are included. Lack o f 
improvement in the magnitude for the difference suggests that the middle partitions 
contribute to differences in 84 as well.
The medians test shows that 62 (38) of the 100 upper (lower) partitions have a 
median above the median o f 0.108 for all 200 partitions. Again, the number o f upper
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partitions with a median above the sample median is significantly greater than that for the 
lower partitions at the 0.01 level. The Wilcoxon rank sums test continues to show that 84 
is significantly greater in the upper partitions than in the lower partitions at 0.01. Overall 
these tests suggest that the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor o f the alternative 
hypothesis that as conservatism increases, so does the differential response to operating 
accruals relative to cash flows.
63 Hypothesis 3
The objective o f hypothesis 3 is to ascertain whether there is a positive association 
between the conservatism score and 64 for all firms. The conservatism score ranges from 
77.64 to -0.515 while the 99* and 1” percentile values are 2.573 and 0.014. This 
suggests that the highest score(s) are extreme in their magnitudes relative to other score 
values. Thus to reduce noise, median values o f the conservatism score are used to test 
hypothesis 3. The first two columns in table 6  panel C show the Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients between the median conservatism score and 84 for all 300 
partitions. The Pearson correlation coefficient is O.l 19 and significantly positive at the 
0.05 level while the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.153 and significantly positive at 
the 0 .01  level.
When excluding the middle 100 partitions the Pearson correlation is 0.129 and 
remains significant at the 0.05 level. The Spearman correlation indicates a positive 
correlation of 0.174 that is significant at the 0.01 level. Both the Pearson and Spearman 
tests suggest that the null o f no association between the conservatism score and the 
differential information content o f operating accruals can be rejected.
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CHAPTER 7
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND SENSITIVITY TESTS
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I discuss alternative 
measures o f conservatism and then compare them to my conservatism measure. Within 
the second section, I investigate the relation o f the differential information content of 
operating accruals, 04, with combinations o f score components representing items for 
which specific accounting treatment is either mandated or nonmandated. I also briefly 
examine the relation between my findings for 84 and proxies for the denominator 
components o f the conservatism multiplier, persistence and growth. In the third section 1 
use a firm-specific design to analyze the robustness o f results presented in section 6 .
7.1 Alternative Measures of Conservatism
Although they do not attempt to measure firms’ unrecorded assets, alternative 
proxies for conservatism exist. Finding a positive relation between my score and several 
alternatives may give the reader confidence that my score is capturing the notion o f 
conservatism. Thus within the following section, I assess correlations among my score 
and two additional proxies for conservatism. I also revisit hypothesis testing and 
compare results obtained using my score versus the alternatives.
7.1.1 Feltham and Ohison's Linear Information Model
One alternative measure of conservatism can be derived from Feltham and 
Ohison’s ( 1995) linear information model. They specify future abnormal operating 
earnings as a function o f the persistence (ton) o f this period's abnormal operating
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earnings (ox '), the conservatism (CO12) embedded in this period’s net operating assets (oa,) 
and other information (vt) as follows:
oxVi = 0)n 0 x't + o)i2oa, + v, + s,+i ( 10)
Since 0)12 is an adjustment for the understatement o f the book value o f  operating assets
relative to their market value, the magnitude o f to 12 is expected to increase as the gap
between market and book value increases. Thus an estimate of coa can proxy for 
conservatism. To facilitate assessments o f whether to,2 and my conservatism score 
appear to capture a similar construct, 1 estimate to,2 for each of the 300 conservatism 
partitions. 1 expect the estimate o f CO12 to be larger (smaller) for the upper (lower) 
partitions.
Equation (10) is estimated by conservatism partition as follows:
o x 'i , t=  Y ooa(,t.i+  Y io x 'u -i +  e u  (11)
To estimate conservatism, I deflate eill variables by begiruiing-of-period net operating 
assets, resulting in oa,>i being expressed as a  constant. Other information is lumped into 
the error term. Abnormal earnings for firm i, time t, ox' i,i, are defined as earnings less an 
interest charge, where the interest charge equals the beginning-of-period book value 
multiplied by the risk-free rate. The one-year treasury bill rate proxies for the risk-free 
rate. The term oa^ is operating assets for firm/, time t. Operating assets are defined as 
they were for equation (3). Deflation expresses oa^.} as a constant and its coefficient, Yo 
represents the mean ratio o f  abnormal operating earnings to net recorded operating assets. 
Net recorded operating assets are also used as a scalar for my score.
Book values for net operating assets are key components in calculating my score 
and Yo, and the conservatism in these book values can change from period to period.
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Thus, I use assets from the same point in time for assessing the relation between yo and 
my score. Since beginning-of-period net operating assets is used to estimate Yo, I use the 
beginning-of-period conservatism score. This is available for 3,281 of the original 3,825 
observations.
To assess the correlation between yo and the conservatism score, equation (11) 
and the median conservatism score are estimated for each of 300 partitions comprised of 
the 3,281 observations. The mean (median) coefficient on prior-period abnormal 
operating earnings, yi, is 0.898 (0.945) and significantly greater than zero at 0.01. The 
mean (median) estimate for conservatism, yo, is 0.019 (0.015) and is also positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 7 shows that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between yo and the median 
total conservatism score is 0.292 (0.174). Both o f these correlations are positive and 
significant at 0.01. Correlations between each component of the score and yo are also 
examined. Both parametric and nonparametric correlation coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero for the unrecorded assets from inventory and 
unrecognized gains and losses on pension assets. Correlations between the remaining 
components o f  the conservatism score and yo are positive and significant at the 0 .1 0  
level. Although not all components exhibit a positive and significant correlation with yo, 
the total conservatism score does at the 0.01 level. This evidence suggests that my 
conservatism score and yo show similarities.
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7.1.2 Market-to-Book Ratio
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) assert that the market-to-book ratio may be an 
indicator o f conservative accounting practice. If market value is greater than book value 
then conservatism is assumed present. They temper this assertion by acknowledging that 
the variance in stock prices may inhibit the ratio’s ability to proxy for conservatism in 
recording operating assets. Market-to-Book is used as a proxy for conservatism by 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Myers (1999), it is also used by Collins and BCothari (1989) 
to measure growth opportunities and/or risk. Because stock prices may contain factors 
unrelated to conservatism in recording operating assets in addition to being subjected to 
random variance, the market-to-book ratio may not provide a superior indication o f 
conservatism relative to my conservatism score or yo- A-priori, 1 expect that each of 
these measures provide an indication o f conservatism. Thus finding a relation among my 
score and these alternatives gives some confidence that my score is capturing the 
underlying constmct o f conservatism.
7.1.2.1 Correlations Among Market-to-Book, yo and My Conservatism Score
The reduced sample of 3,281 firm years has the necessary data for assessing the 
relation among all three proxies for conservatism: market-to-book, my score and yo- 
Since a  firm's conservatism may vary across time, 1 use beginning market-to-book so that 
all conservatism alternatives are measured at the same point in time. Table 7 presents 
correlations for the median market-to-book ratio, median conservatism score and 
estimated yo for the 300 partitions. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation between market- 
to-book and yo is 0.204 (0.143) and significantly positive at 0.05. Although not 
correlated with each component o f  my score, the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between 
market-to-book and my total score is 0.258 (0.471) while the Pearson (Spearman)
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correlation between yo and my total score is 0.292 (0.174); all correlations are 
significantly positive at 0.01 Evidence suggests an association among market-to-book, 
Yo, and my score, lending confidence that my score captures the underlying construct of 
conservatism. Since a relation among these measures is demonstrated, I revisit 
hypothesis testing and use the alternative measures o f conservatism to partition firm-year 
observations.
7,2 Hypothesis Testing with Alternative Measures of Conservatism
Within this section I revisit the hypotheses while partitioning on market-to-book. 
Penman and Zheng (1999) use a  measue o f conservatism that includes the unrecorded 
R&D, advertising and inventory assets only. I partition firm years using this group of 
components as well, hereafter referred to as the reduced score. For ease o f comparison, 
results obtained from partitioning on my conservatism score are also included in the 
tables. I partition firms on the yo coefficient obtained in equation (11) in later firm- 
specific analyses.
7.2.1 Hypothesis 1
The alternative form of hypothesis 1 predicts that the return response to operating 
accruals will be greater than that to cash flows. Hypothesis 1 is simply a test of whether 
the mean 84  coefficient from equation (3) is significant and positive across partitions. 
Because this is a test o f  the average value for the coefficient across all partitions, 1 do not 
expect alternative partitioning methods to give conflicting results for hypothesis 1.
“  I also examine the relation between market-to-book and a larger sample which more closely 
represents the sample used for hypothesis testing. Pearson (Spearman) correlations between my total score 
and market-to-book are 0.310 (0.447) and significant at the 0.01 (0 .01 ) level for the 3 ,821 firm-year 
observations having end-of-period data for both conservatism proxies.
45
Estimates (not presented) for the pooled sample and the 300 partitions formed using 
various conservatism specifications all show a 84 coefficient that is not reliably different 
from zero. This suggests that the null hypothesis o f  a zero or negative differential 
response to operating accruals cannot be rejected. As expected, these results are 
consistent under all conservatism measures.
7.2.2 Hypothesis 2
The alternative form of hypothesis 2 posits that the differential return response to 
operating accruals will be greater for firm years exhibiting a "high" versus a "low" degree of 
conservatism. The 300 partitions are categorized as possessing either 'high’ or Mow’ 
conservatism where partition 300 (I) represents the firm years with the highest (lowest) 
overall conservatism scores. Equation (3) is estimated for each o f  the 300 partitions. The 
04 coefficients obtained for the "high’ conservatism category are compared to the 04 
coefficients for the ‘low’ conservatism category. To remain consistent with analyses in 
section 6 , the middle 10 0  conservatism partitions are included in the first analysis and 
then excluded to determine if there is statistical improvement afforded when only the 
more extreme conservatism score partitions are compared.
Table 8 , panel A shows results for tests of differences in 04 between the upper and 
lower conservatism partitions. When either the reduced score or market-to-book is used 
for partitioning, none o f  the tests provide evidence o f a greater differential return response 
to operating accruals for the upper partitions, at the 0.10 level o f significance. This 
suggests that although a  correlation between market-to-book and my conservatism score 
exists, my score distinguishes between firms in a manner which allows the differential
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response to operating accruals to be more readily detected when using these analysis 
techniques. Results also suggest that a measure more comprehensive than the sum o f the 
unrecorded R&D, advertising and inventory assets is needed for assessing the differential 
information content of operating accruals.
7.2 J  Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 addresses whether a  positive association exists between the 
conservatism score and 84 across partitions. Table 8 , panel B shows the Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients between the median conservatism score and the 
estimated differential return response to operating accruals, 84, for the partitions. When 
firms are partitioned on the reduced score, both Pearson and Spearman correlations 
between the conservatism score and 84 are not reliably different from zero at the 0 .1 0  
level.
Evidence for market-to-book gives Pearson correlations that are positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level while Spearman correlations are not reliably different from 
zero at 0.10. Thus, evidence is not consistent when partitioning on market-to-book. 
Sorting on my score shows a significant and positive relation between conservatism and 
04 and is consistent for both Pearson and Spearman correlations. Overall this suggests 
that my conservatism score partitions firms in a manner that makes a positive association 
between 84 and conservatism more apparent when compared to market-to-book and the 
reduced score.
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73  Equation (3) Coefficients, Implications from Feltham and Ohlson (1995)
Feltham and Ohison’s (1995) theory provides for additional predictions about the 
coefficients from the retum-eamings relation in equation (3). The response to earnings in 
general is (0 1 + 02  + 03). The 0 1 coefficient is the return response to earnings from 
financial activities and the sum of 8 % and 03 represents the differential response to 
abnormal earnings from operating activities. Since financial activities are not expected to 
generate abnormal earnings, Feltham and Ohison’s (1995) theory predicts that 0% will be 
equal to ‘ 1.’ However, their prediction is based on total returns whereas I use a market- 
adjusted measure o f returns. Thus, I cannot make predictions about the magnitude o f my 
estimate o f 0 (.
Recall that conservatism is expected to affect the differential response to 
operating accruals only. Thus, the coefficients capturing the return response to operating 
cash flows are not expected to vary across conservatism partitions. Predictions and tests 
for differences in means between the high and low conservatism groups are shown in 
Exhibit 1 :
EXHIBIT 1
Low Conservatism 
Lower ISO Partitions
Difference in Means Between High 
and Low Conservatism Partitions 
300 Partitions
Predicted Predicted
Value Estimate Value Estimate
01 9 0.336 0 0.693
( 8 2 + 03) ? 2.402*** 0 -0 .1 2 2
(01 +  02+03) ? 2.737*** 0 0.571
04 7 -0.084 > 0 0.192***
•indicates significance at 0.10 • •  indicates significance at 0.05 •••indicates significance at 0.01 
All tests examine whether coefficients, and their differences, are equal to zero.
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The mean 0i across all 300 conservatism partitions is .683 and significantly 
different from zero at 0 .0 1 ; this mean is not different from one at the 0 .1 0  level o f 
significance. The 6 i coefficient is 1.029 (0.336) for the upper (lower) conservatism 
partitions, and the difference o f 0.693 is not reliably different from zero at the 0.10 level. 
Wilcoxon rank sum scores and tests o f medians (not reported) also show that the 
difference in 0 i between the upper and lower partitions is not significantly different from 
zero at 0 .10.
Exhibit 1 shows that the mean response to abnormal operating cash flows (01 + 82 
+ 0 j) is not different for the upper versus the lower partitions at the 0 .1 0  level of 
significance. The Wilcoxon rank sum scores and the tests o f medians (not reported) 
provide similar inferences. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation between the median 
conservatism score and the response to abnormal operating cash flows for the 300 
partitions is 0.086 (0.044) and not reliably different from zero at the 0.10 level. The 
Pearson and Spearman correlations o f -0.037 and -0.092 between the differential response 
to abnormal operating cash flows and the median conservatism score are not significantly 
different from zero at 0.10. Taken together, evidence suggests that the response to cash 
flows is not systematically different across conservatism partitions.
7.4 Additional Cross-Sectional Analyses
Within this section 1 examine the relation of the differential return response to 
operating accruals with ( 1) mandated and nonmandated conservatism score components 
and (2 ) growth and persistence.
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7.4.1 M andated and Nonmandated Score Components
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) do not distinguish between origins o f conservatism 
when making their predictions about its relation with the differential retum-response to 
operating accruals. Components of my score can be segregated into two categories based 
on whether or not accounting discretion is available to managers. Financial Accounting 
Standards require that R&D and advertising outlays be immediately expensed. Thus, 
specific accounting treatment is mandated. For the re m a in in g  components, financial 
accounting standards allow some flexibility. Prior literature shows an association 
between managers' accounting choices and the retum-response to earnings.
This raises the question o f whether the link between conservatism and the 
differential response to operating accruals (84) in table 6  is primarily due to mandatory or 
nonmandatory conservatism. I investigate this question by estimating the following 
equation using the original (300) conservatism partitions formed for hypothesis testing:^® 
64.p = 60 + 6/NONMANDATEDp + 62 MANDATEDp (12)
where the subscript p, ( I . . .300), represents the conservatism partitions. 84 is the 
estimated partition-specific coefficient on operating accruals from equation (3), 
NONMANDATED is the median sum of the inventory, accounts receivable, depreciation 
and pension assets while MANDATED is the median sum o f the unrecorded R&D and 
advertising assets.
”  To test whether the mandatory or nonmandatory score components have a greater impact on the 
differential response to operating accruals in general, 1 would need to re-sort my sample on these 
components. A Rill examination is beyond the scope o f  this paper. However, some preliminary analyses 
suggest no distinction in the impact o f  mandatory versus nonmandatory items.
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EXHIBIT 2
bo b, bj
-0.174 0.828* 0.114*
•indicates significance at 0 . 1 0 , tests are one-tailed
Exhibit 2 shows that the coefficient on both subsets o f score components is greater than 
zero at the 0 .1 0  level, indicating that my estimate o f 84 is associated with both mandated 
and nonmandated items, given the other. Yet my main focus is to determine whether 
either subset o f items is more highly associated with 84. A test o f (6 / - bi) gives an F- 
value of 1.798; showing that the difference in these coefficients is not reliably different 
from zero at the 0 .1 0  level and suggesting that neither set o f  components is more highly 
associated with my estimate o f  84.
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7.4.2 Persistence and Growth
In their model o f a firm's market value equation (1), Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
define the conservatism multiplier on operating assets, a.2, as S)i2Rf / (Rf-S)n)(Rf- &22). 
&I2 represents conservatism in recording operating assets, S)n is the persistence of 
abnormal earnings, S)22 is the growth in operating assets and Rf is the risk-free rate. Since 
the conservatism multiplier increases in persistence and growth, I expect that the 
differential return response to operating accruals from equation (3), 04, may exhibit a 
positive association with persistence and growth. Thus, I assess the relation between 04 
and proxies for these variables.
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define persistence as the multiplier, B)i i, on abnormal 
operating earnings from their linear information model, presented as my equation ( 10). 
Thus 1 use an estimate of this multiplier from my equation (11), yi, to proxy for 
persistence. Since Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define growth in terms o f operating assets, 
I use the percentage change in net operating assets to proxy for growth.^®
To assess the relation o f persistence with my findings for the return response on 
operating accruals in table 6 ,1  partition firm-year observations on their conservatism 
score and estimate 04 and y 1 for each partition.^ ‘ Pearson and Spearman correlations 
between these estimates are not reliably different from zero at the 0.10 level. To examine 
04's relation to my proxy for growth, 1 assess the correlation between the partition-specific
Findings are not sensitive to using the percentage change in total versus net operating assets.
A thorough examination o f  whether the differential information content o f  operating accruals is 
related to growth and persistence in general would require re-sorting the sample on those variables. A 
complete examination o f this relation is beyond the scope o f this paper. 1 use the original partitions because 
my objective is to assess the correlation between these variables and my estimate o f  64 , used for hypothesis 
testing.
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estimate o f 84 and the partition-specific median percentage change in net operating assets. 
I find that these Pearson and Spearman correlations are also not significantly different 
from zero at the 0.10 level. Thus when using these estimation techniques, 1 do not find 
empirical evidence o f a systematic and significant relation between these proxies for 
persistence and growth and my estimate for the differential retum-response to operating 
accruals.
7.5 Firm-Specific Sensitivity Analyses
To this point, I have utilized cross-sectional designs. Teets & Wasley (1996) 
show that cross-sectional estimation provides a smaller coefficient when compared to a 
firm-specific estimation for the same sample. Further, the downward bias in the cross- 
sectional coefficients may not be evenly distributed across groups, leading to incorrect 
inferences about between-group differences.
7.5.1 Teets and Wasley (1996)
Teets and Wasley (1996) attribute the downward bias in cross-sectional response 
coefficients to ‘disproportionately heavy weights’ being placed on firm-years with a 
higher variance in the independent variable. Although this variance is the appropriate 
deflator, to the extent that firm-years with higher variances are systematically distributed 
among partitions, so is the downward effect on the response coefficients.
Thus a systematically higher variance o f operating accruals within the lower 
conservatism partitions may contribute toward earlier findings in favor of Feltham and 
Ohison’s (1995) predictions. To assess this likelihood, I obtain the variance o f operating
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accruals for each o f the 300 conservatism partitions and find that the mean variance for 
the upper (lower) 150 partitions is 0.063 (0.141) and is significantly greater for the lower 
partitions at the 0.01 level.^” The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the 
median conservatism score and the variance o f operating accruals is -0.387 and 
significant at 0.01. Both the Wilcoxon rank sums and the medians test show that the 
variance for operating accruals is significantly greater for the lower conservatism 
partitions, at the 0.01 level. These tests indicate a systematic difference in the variance of 
operating accruals among conservatism partitions that may have contributed to earlier 
findings o f  an association between conservatism and the differential information content 
o f operating accruals, 84. To alleviate this effect, Teets and Wasley (1996) suggest a 
firm-specific design. Thus I employ a firm-specific design which also allows 
investigation o f another conservatism measure, the coefficient on operating assets from 
equation (II ) , yo-
7 .5^ Firm-Specific Analysis
Descriptive statistics are presented and followed by results from firm-specific 
analyses.
7.5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Firm-Specific Sample
The firm-specific design uses the subset of firms having sufficient data to allow 
estimation o f equations (3) and (11) with a minimum o f 10 annual observations. 
Imposing the additional data requirements gives a reduced sample o f 1,649 firm-year
Consistent with equation (3) operating accruals are deflated by beginning market value o f equity.
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observations and 126 firms. The average number o f  observations per firm is 13 with the 
maximum being 20. The reduced sample appears to be larger firms; the average market 
value (book value) o f equity is 773.22 (390.35) compared to 587.89 (286.92) for the 
sample o f3,825 firm-years. The mean and median conservatism score is 0.496 and 
0.423, slightly different from the mean and median o f  0.536 and 0.392 for the full sample. 
The reduced sample spans the twenty-year period o f  1975 through 1994 whereas the fiill 
sample represents 22 years. Industries with SIC codes between 0-999, 6000-6999 and 
8000-8999 comprising 0.7, 1.5 and 1.7 percent o f the original sample are not represented 
in the reduced sample. Thus, the reader is cautioned that contradictory evidence from 
firm-specific versus cross-sectional analyses may be partially due to sample differences.
1.5.2J. Results From the Firm-Specific Analyses
Panel A of table 10 shows the mean coefficients from equation (3) for the sample 
o f 126 firms. The mean coefficient on earnings, 0i, is neither different from zero nor is it 
different from '1,' at the 0.10 level o f significance. Thus Feltham and Ohison’s (1995) 
prediction that 8 , is equal to one cannot be rejected. The mean coefficient on earnings in 
general, (81 + 62 + 83) is 3.612 and significantly positive at 0.01. Consistent with cross- 
sectional estimation, the coefficient on operating accruals is not reliably different from 
zero at 0 .10, indicating that on average there is no differential return response to 
operating accruals versus cash flows.
I first test hypotheses 2 and 3 by ranking firms on my conservatism score and 
forming 10 groups where group 1 0 ( 1) represents the firms with the highest (lowest) 
median score. The median firm-specific 84 coefficients are then compared between the
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high and low partitions/^ Testing is done in this manner to facilitate comparison between 
firm-specific and cross-sectional analyses. Tests o f differences in 84 between the upper 
and lower conservatism partitions are shown in table 9, panel B. None o f the tests 
provide evidence o f a greater differential return response to operating accruals for the 
upper partitions at the 0.10 level o f significance. In Panel C o f  table 9, both the 
Spearman and Pearson coefficients indicate that the correlation between the median 
conservatism score and the median coefficient on operating accruals is not reliably 
different firora zero. The evidence in table 9, panels B and C suggests that the null of zero 
or no association between differential response to operating accruals and conservatism 
cannot be rejected.
Results from partitioning on the firm-specific estimate o f yo firom equation ( 11) 
are shown in table 9 as well. Wilcoxon rank sums, medians and means tests all indicate 
that the differential response to operating accruals is not significantly different between 
the upper and lower partitions. However panel C o f table 9 shows that the Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation between the median 84 and median yo is positive and significant 
at the 0.01 (0.05) level when the middle 4 partitions are excluded. This evidence suggests 
that there is an association between yo and the differential information content of 
operating accruals. However, the difference in 84 between the upper and lower
"  Medians are used to reduce the potential for noise caused by extreme observations. However, 
results are consistent when firms are sorted on their mean conservatism score and when tests incorporate the 
means for the conservatism score and 8 4 .
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conservatism partitions is not reliably different from zero. Thus, evidence is mixed when 
firms are sorted on yo- ^
When using my conservatism score, firm-specific estimation o f equation (3) does 
not provide results consistent with those using cross-sectional estimations. There are 
several factors that may contribute to the inconsistencies between cross-sectional and 
firm-specific results. Firm-specific estimation requires a median conservatism score for 
each firm in order to test its association with the firm-specific estimate o f 84. Table 5 
shows that my score tends to increase over the years. Since firms are required to have at 
least 10 years of data, a portion o f the variation in conservatism scores may be eliminated 
through this process.
To examine this, I rank the 1,649 firm-years on their annual conservatism scores 
and create three groups. Group 3 (1) represents observations with the highest (lowest) 
conservatism scores. When allowing firms to move between categories over years, I find 
that o f  the 126 firms, only 23 remain in a  single category while 56 firms are present in 
two categories and 47 firms appear in all three categories. For firm-specific analysis, 
firms are assigned to a single relative level o f conservatism. This creates a potential loss 
o f meaningful within-firm variation, which may result in a loss of statistical power. To 
preserve the within-firm variation, I perform a cross-sectional analysis on these firms. 
Findings from the cross-sectional analysis are consistent with those from the firm-specific 
analysis. Evidence does not provide a  basis to conclude that a relation between 
conservatism and the differential information content o f operating accruals exists. A
^  Pearson and Spearman correlations between the 126 firm-specific conservatism scores and the 
firm-specific coefficients on operating accruals, 8 < indicate that these correlations are not reliably different 
from zero at 0.10 under either conservatism specification, my score or Yo.
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separate cross-sectional examination of the remaining 2,176 firm years, not included in 
the firm-specific sample, gives results consistent with the analyses in section 6. Hence, I 
infer that the different implications drawn from firm-specific versus cross-sectional 
analysis may be related to sample differences as opposed to analysis methods.
Teets and Wasley (1996) find that systematic between-partition differences in the 
variance of an independent variable may create a systematic bias in its coefficient.^^ Thus 
1 examine the samples o f 2,176 and 1,649 firm-year observations to ascertain whether the 
variance for operating accruals is systematically different across conservatism partitions. 
The Spearman rank correlation, medians test and Wilcoxon rank sums tests all indicate 
that the variance of operating accruals is higher for the lower conservatism partitions at 
the 0.01 level o f significance. This occurs for both samples, and the cross-sectional 
analyses for the 1,649 firm-year observations did not show a higher 04 coefficient for the 
higher conservatism partitions. Thus I conclude that the difference between firm-specific 
and cross-sectional results may be more likely due to other sample differences such as the 
survivorship bias imposed by firm-specific estimation, than the systematic difference in 
the variance o f operating accruals across partitions.
These samples differ on size. The mean (median) market value o f  equity is 773.22 (110.59) for 
the sample used in firm-specific estimation versus 447.44 (42.97) for the remaining 2176 observations. To 
examine the relation between size and conservatism, I use the original 300 partitions and assess the 
correlation between the partition-specific median market value o f  equity and the median conservatism score. 
The Pearson and Spearman correlations are 0.155 and 0.594 respectively, and both are significant at the 
0.01. I also assess the relation between market value o f  equity and my hndings o f  the differential 
information content o f operating accruals (8 4 ), given conservatism by estimating the following model by 
partition:
04 ,p = 60  + 6 ,CONSERVATISM SCORE, + bj  MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY,
The coefficient on the median conservatism score is 0.151 and significant at 0.01 while the coefficient on 
the median market value o f  equity is 0.0001 and not significant at the 0.10 level. Overall this indicates that 
given conservatism, market value o f  equity is not associated with the differential information content of 
operating accruals.
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CHAPTERS
CONCLUSIONS
The objective o f this study is to test the implication from Feltham and Ohison’s 
(1995) theory that the differential response to operating accruals, relative to cash flows, is 
increasing in accounting conservatism. Since Feltham and Ohlson (1995) define 
conservatism as the imderstatement in the book values for operating assets, I create a 
conservatism score to estimate a firm’s unrecorded operating assets. I also employ the 
existing proxies of market-to-book, an estimate from Feltham and Ohison’s (1995) model 
for abnormal earnings and a reduced version o f  my score. A consistently significant and 
positive correlation between my score and the existing alternatives suggests that my score 
is capturing a similar construct.
To assess the differential return response to operating accruals, both a cross- 
sectional and a firm-specific design are used. When observations are not partitioned on 
conservatism, the null hypothesis o f  a zero or negative differential response to operating 
accruals cannot be rejected. Yet in general, analyses indicate that when firm years are 
sorted on my score, the differential return response on operating accruals is greater for 
firm years exhibiting higher degrees o f conservatism. Evidence is mixed for market-to- 
book and for the reduced version o f my score; overall, the null of a zero or negative 
differential response to operating accruals cannot be rejected. These findings suggest that 
my score sorts firm years in a  manner that makes the differential response to operating 
accruals more readily observed. Yet because o f  the data constraints imposed, the reader is 
cautioned about generalizing these findings to the entire population of firms.
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Teets and Wasley (1996) assert that a systematic difference in the variance of an 
independent variable across groups will create a systematic bias in the value o f its 
coefficient across those groups. They suggest a firm-specific design to alleviate this 
difficulty. Since tests indicate a systematic difference in the variance o f operating 
accruals across conservatism partitions, I use a firm-specific design for the subset o f firms 
having sufficient data. Overall, these results show that the null hypothesis o f a zero or 
negative association between the differential return response to operating accruals and 
conservatism caimot be rejected. The exception being a marginal differential response 
when firms are sorted on a  proxy for conservatism derived from Feltham and Ohison’s 
(1995) abnormal earnings specification. A separate cross-sectional analysis using just the 
observations used in the firm-specific design also fails to reject the null. Overall, it 
spears  more likely that the discrepancies between the firm-specific and cross-sectional 
designs are from other sample differences.
I also examine the behavior o f the return response to abnormal operating earnings 
and to earnings in general. Evidence supports Feltham and Ohison’s (1995) implications 
that the response to earnings in general and abnormal operating earnings will not vary 
with conservatism.
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing and testing an 
alternative measure o f  conservatism. This measure differs from previous measures in that 
it estimates a  firm’s unrecorded assets as a continuous versus a  dichotomous variable 
(Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1981; Pincus, 1991; Salamon and Kopel, 1993). My findings 
also contribute to the literature addressing the differential response o f cash flows versus 
accruals by examining the contextual factor of conservatism. Evidence is also provided
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on the consistency o f coefficients in a return earnings relation with Feltham and Ohison’s 
(1995) model.
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APPENDIX 1
This appendix demonstrates that the change in price with respect to accrued 
earnings and cash earnings is I + a ,  + a% and 1 + a i , respectively. I begin with Feltham 
and Ohlson’s (1995) proposition 3 which expresses the market value o f a firm as:
Pt = b v ,+  aiO x“t +  a2oat + p*v, (1)
where as before,
Pt = the market value o f  the firm's equity, date t. 
bv, = the book value o f the firm's equity, date t. 
ox% = abnormal operating earnings for period (t-l,t). 
oat = operating assets, net o f operating liabilities, date t. 
v, = other information, date t.
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) make four assumptions regarding basic accoimting relations 
as well as assuming a linear process for generating o x \  oa, and v,.^  ^ The
four accoimting relations are:
(1) Clean surplus which states that all changes in book value are reported as 
either income or dividends, such that bvt = bvt-i + Xt - dt where X| 
represents total earnings while dt represents net dividends for time t.^ ^
2) Net interest relation for financial assets stated as i, = (Rf- l)fa,.i where i, 
and fan depict interest income ant 
the risk-free interest rate plus one.
t-i d financial assets, respectively.^* R, is
(3) Financial asset relation portraying current period financial assets as
fat = fat-1 + it + Ct - dt where Ct represents cash flows which are defined as 
operating and investing cash flows.
is also assumed that the market value of a  firm’s equity is equal to the present value of 
expected (net) dividends.
^^The clean surplus assumption is violated when either gains or losses do not flow through the 
income statement and are taken directly to stockholders’ equity. Some instances where accounting 
standards require gains or losses to be written directly to stockholders’ equity are SFAS No. 52 (Foreign 
Currency Translation), SFAS No. 87 (the excess o f  any additional pension liability over unrecognized prior 
service cost), SFAS No. 115 (unrealized holding gains and losses on available for sale securities) and SFAS 
No. 133 (unrealized gains and losses on derivative instruments used to hedge cash flows).
^*Feltham and Ohlson ( 1995) cite marketable securities and bonds payable as examples of 
financial assets and liabilities, respectively.
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(4) The operating asset relation can be inferred from the clean surplus and 
financial asset relation. This relation is stated as 
oat =  oa,., + ox, - c,.
From relations (3) and (4) it can be seen that financial assets are increased by cash flows 
and that operating assets are increased by the difference between operating earnings and 
cash flows.
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) consider three parameters when specifying the linear
process generating ox \, oa, and v,. Those parameters are the persistence o f abnormal
earnings (&,,), growth o f operating assets (&#) and accounting conservatism (S)i2)-^ ’
Feltham and Ohison's (1995) linear information model is
specified in their equations 10(a) - 10(d), p. 702 as follows:
oxVi ~ S), ,ox“t + 8)j2oa, + V|t + 6,^ -, 
o a ^ - ,  =  6 ) 2 2 0 3 ,  +  V2t +  E2t+1
Vlt+1 =  Y lV it  +  8 3 ,+ ,
V2t+1 == Y2V2t + £41+1
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) use the linear information model, equation (1) and the
assumption that goodwill represents the present value of expected future abnormal
earnings and can be expressed as the difference between market and book value to derive
the following solutions for the multipliers in equation (I):
tt2=  6 ),2R f/ (R f-6 )n ) (  R f-  S>22) 
a ,  =  6),, /  (Rf-6)ii)
P ~  (Pi>P2) =  [R f /  (R f-2 ),i)  ( R f-Y i), o-i! ( Rf - Y2)]
The multipliers, a ,  and 0 2 , are functions o f the degree of the persistence o f abnormal
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) constrain the parameter values as follows: |y,| < I, 
0< 6ii|<l,l i  S>22 ^  kfi &),2^  0.
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earnings and accounting conservatism for operating assets, respectively. Hence if  there is 
no persistence o f  abnormal earnings then a ,  will be equal to zero, and if there is no 
conservatism, a? will be equal to zero.
Recall that according to the operating and financial asset relations, cash earnings 
affect financial assets but not operating assets while accrued earnings affect operating 
assets but not financial assets. Also recall that a firm's book value is the sum o f its 
financial and operating assets. To see the implications that cash and accrued earnings 
have for a firm's market value (ignoring v, other information), Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
take the partial derivative o f  equation (1):'*°
5Pt/SAccrued Earnings =1 + a i + a 2
8Pt /SCash Earnings = 1 + (%,
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) interpret this as meaning that a firm’s market value will 
change by 1 + a t + for an incremental dollar of accrued earnings and by 1 + a i for an 
incremental dollar o f cash earnings. The differential effect of accrued earnings for market
^°The assumption that v is equal to 0 is an empirical issue. Hand and Landsman ( 1998) examine 
the role o f  other information in the context o f  dividend signaling. They provide empirical evidence that 
dividends have differential valuation implications for loss firms. Hand and Landsman (1998) also note that 
within some o f  the more recent literature v is assumed either to be 0  o r to be captured in the intercept term.
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value is attributed to a ;  which by definition is greater than (equal to) zero if  the 
accounting practices are (not) conservative.
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
3825 Firm-Year Obsei-vations 
Years 1975 through 1996
Mean Standard
Deviation
M inimum Maximum Median
Market Value o f  Equity 587,89 1953.92 0.23 38192.5 61.87
Book Value of Equity 286.92 807.0 0.043 9015.0 41.86
Market-to-Book Ratio 2 .2 0 7.16 0.139 288.0 1.45
Net Operating Assets 389.81 1160.54 0.032 22879 56.93
Earnings 48.35 149.17 0.013 2295.0 6.096
Abnormal Operating Earnings 25.09 105.94 -542.82 2037.75 2.06
Raw Returns 0.282 0.613 -0.829 12.27 0.161
Conservatism Score 0.536 1.471 -0.515 77.64 0.392
•In Millions o r Dollars
M arket Value o f E quity , beginning o f period  is dcl'ined as common shares outstanding x price, compusiai data items «25 and «199, respectively.
Book Value o f Equity , beginning o f period is defined is compustat data item #60.
Net O pera ting  Assets are defined as (total assets - cash and short-term investments ■ investments and advances, equity method and other) - (total liabilities -short-tcnn debt in current assets
-long -te rm  debt) compustat data items (#6-#  I - #31 - # 3 2 ) -  (#181 - #34 - #9).
E arn ings are defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, compustat data item #18
A bnorm al O pera ting  E arn ings are defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (compustat data item # 18) less normal earnings computed as book value 
(data item #60) multiplied by the risk-free rate. The risk-free rate is proxied for by the one-year treasury-bill rate.
R aw  R etu rns are cumulated over the 12-month period ending three months alter the fiscal year end.
C onservatism  Score is defined ts  the sum o f the unrecorded R&D asset, advertising asset, inventory asset, accuums reeeis able asset, depreeiation asset and unrecognized gams and losses 
on pension assets divided by net operating assets
TABLE 2 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES FOR 
R&D AND ADVERTISING ASSETS
All Firm s with Non Missing C urrent-Period and Lagged 
Data
All Firm s with Non Missing 
C urrent-Period Data
R&D Asset Adveriislnv Asset R&D Asset Advertisini! Asset
Finn -Year Observations 7,504 1,684 11,942 9,434
Number of 2-Digit SIC 
Codes Represented
42 36 53 62
Unrecorded Asset 
Measures Usina:
Current-Period Expenditures 0 .1 0 0 0.137 0.105 0.098
Expenditures for All 
Available Periods
0.267 0.461 0.260 0.258
Current-Period Expenditures 
Considering Growth
0.258 0.429 0.267 0.273
Current-Period Expenditures 
NOT Considering Growth
0.306 0.523 0.318 0.326
C u rren t-P erio d  E xpenditu res represent the measure for the R&D and Advertising assets whereby ONLY eurrent-period expenditures are included in the computation 
E xpend itu res fo r all availab le  periods represents the measure for the R&D and Advertising assets whereby Tirms are constrained to having nonmissing current-period data and only available data is
used Tor prior-period lags. M issing lags are replaced with a  value o f  zero.
C u rren t-P erio d  E xpend itu res C onsidering  G row th  represents the measure for the R&D and Advertising assets whereby firms are only constrained to having nonmissing current-period data Current-
period expenditures and the industry growth rate are used to estimate prior-period expenditures.
C u rren t-P erio d  E xpenditu res N O T  C onsidering  G row th  represents the measure for the R&D and Advertising assets wliereby firms are only constrained to having nonmissing current-period data.
I lowever, all prior-period expenditures are assumed to equal current-period expenditures.
TABLE 3
Conservatism Score Components 
Descriptive Statistics
Item
Firm-Year
Observations
Mean Sid Deviation M inimum M aximum Median
R&D 2711 0.136 0.003 0 .0 0 0 2.570 0.066
A D V 2247 0.148 0.018 0 .0 0 0 55.470 0 .0 2 1
IN V 1448 0.035 0 .0 0 1 -0,04 1,030 0 .0 0 0
UGL 333 -0.013 0 . 0 0 1 -1.624 0.041 0 .0 0 0
A R 3679 0,015 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 8.125 0.009
DEP 3716 0.214 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 14.050 0.166
SCO RE 3825 0.536 0.024 -0.515 77.640 0.392
K & l) is defined as the unrecorded R&D asset requiring no missing data for the current period.
ADVO is defined as the unrecorded advertising asset requiring no missing data for the current period.
INV is tiie unrecorded inventory asset.
l iG l.  is the unrecorded gains or losses from pension plan assets.
AK is the unrecorded accounts receivable asset 
U E P R  is the unrecorded depreciation asset.
S C O R E  is the sum o f  the unrecorded assets, R&D+ADV+INV+UOL+AR+DEPR. **AII Hems are dejlaied by nei operating assets
3:!
TABLE 4
Conservatism Score Components
SIC Codes (Firm-Years) 
Major Industry Class
R&D
Mean
(Median)
ADV
Mean
(Median)
INV
Mean
(Median)
UGL
Mean
(Median)
AR
Mean
(Median)
DEPR
Mean
(Median)
SCORE
Mean
(Mediatt)
0-999(16) 
Agriculture & Forestry
0 .1 0 0
(0 . 1 2 0 )
0.063
(0.073)
0 ,0 0 0
(0 ,0 0 0 )
-0.035
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.005
(0.005)
0.003
(0.109)
0,245
(0,243)
1000-1999 (48) 
Mining & Construction
0.196
(0.178)
0.028
(0 .0 0 0 )
0,013
(0 .0 0 0 )
-0 .0 2 0
(0 .0 0 0 )
0 .0 2 0
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.363
(0.233)
0.600
(0.489)
2000-2999 (991)
Food, Apparel, Lumber & Paper
0.106
(0.048)
0 .2 1 2
(0.015)
0.035
(0.014)
-0.016
(0 .0 0 0 )
0 .0 1 2
(0.008)
0.197
(0.168)
0.545
(0,392)
3000-3999 (1955) 
Manufacturing
0.180
(0.115)
0.033
(0.015)
0.042
(0 .0 0 0 )
-0.015
(0 ,0 0 0 )
0,0126
(0,009)
0.215
(0,173)
0,467
(0.390)
4000-4999 (57) 
Transportation & Communication
0.023
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.046
(0 .0 0 0 )
0 ,0 0 0
(0 ,0 0 0 )
-0,004
(0 ,0 0 0 )
0,017
(0.006)
0.313
(0.265)
0.396
(0.360)
5000-5999 (444) 
Wholesale & Retail
0.004
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.257
(0.195)
0,040
(0 .0 0 0 )
-0 ,0 0 2
(0 ,0 0 0 )
0 .0 1 1  
(0.005)
0.147
(0 . 1 0 1 )
0.457
(0.366)
6000-6999 (32) 
Insurance, Real Estate & 
Investment Brokers
0.237
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.262
(0.322)
0 .0 1 1
(0 .0 0 0 )
0 ,0 0 0
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.023
(0 .0 1 1 )
0.192
(0.173)
0.726
(0.515)
7000-7999 (245) 
Personal & Business Services
0.161
(0.005)
0.671
(0.049)
0.0003
(0 .0 0 0 )
-0.005
(0 .0 0 0 )
0.048
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.361
(0.254)
1.235
(0.444)
8000-8999 (37)
Educ,, Social & Gov’t. Services
0.104
(0.050)
0 ,0 1 2
(0 ,0 0 0 )
0.014
(0 ,0 0 0 )
0 ,0 0 0
(0 ,0 0 0 )
0 .0 2 1
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.192
(0,149)
0.342
(0.270)
R & n  is defined as the unrecorded R&D asset requiring no missing data for the current period,
ADV is defined as the unrecorded advertising asset requiring no missing data Tor the current period 
INV is the unrecorded inventory asset.
IS the unrecorded gains or losses from pension plan assets 
AK is tlie unrecorded aecounts receivable asset 
DKI’K IS  the unrecorded depreciation asset
Sf'O K K  IS the sum o f  the unrecorded assets, K&D+ADV+INV+lKiL+AR+DEI’R * VI// ilems are i/e/Iaietl hy net o/vriiiiiijt a u e n
Table 5
Conservatism Score Components
Year
N=
R&D ADV INV UGL AR DEP SCORE
1975
(135) 0.077 0.093 0.027 0 .0 1 0.133 0.34
1976
(145) 0.087 0.497 0.027 0.067 0234 0.913
1977
(197) 0.081 0.129 0.031 0.014 0.141 0.397
1978
(207) 0.085 0.123 0.033 0 .0 1 2 0.143 0.397
1979
(233) 0.091 0.114 •in^ 3 0.013 0.143 0.404
1980
(2 0 1 ) 0.091 0.094 0.047 0 .0 1 2 0.142 0.386
1981
(166) 0.114 0.076 0.065 0 .0 1 1 0.183 0.45
1982
(143) 0 . 1 2 2 0.097 0.056 0 .0 1 1 0.184 0.471
1983
(155) 0.137 0.106 0.051 0 .0 1 2 0.183 0.49
1984
(193) 0.142 0.089 0.04 0 .0 1 1 0.206 0.488
1985
(171) 0.148 0.113 0.036 0 .0 1 2 0.195 0.503
1986
(186) 0.151 0.083 0.029 0 .0 1 2 0239 0.515
1987
(203) 0.149 0.137 0.03 0.013 0263 0.591
1988
(244) 0.158 0.166 0.032 0 .0 1 1 0.218 0.585
1989
(238) 0.149 0.169 0.03 0 .0 1 1 0.261 0.62
1990
(225) 0.163 0 .2 0 2 0.032 0.014 0.244 0.654
1991
(233) 0.189 0.183 0.025 -0.033 0.015 0283 0.662
1992
(234) 0.188 0.174 0.026 -0.06 0.014 0.299 0.642
1993
(238) 0.181 0.176 0.029 -0.095 0.014 0.280 0.586
1994
(72) 0.172 0.171 0.030 -0.060 0 .0 2 0 0.266 0.599
1995
(5) 0.214 0.034 0 .0 0 0 -0 .1 1 2 0.016 0.141 0.292
1996
(I) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0.008 0 .0 0 0 0.008
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TABLE 5 CONTINUED:
R&D is dcGned as the unrecorded R&D asset requiring no missing data for the current period.
ADV is deGned as the unrecorded advertising asset requiring no missing data for the current period.
INV is the unrecorded inventory asset.
UGL is the unrecorded gains or losses from pension plan assets.
AR is the unrecorded accounts receivable asset 
DEPR is the unrecorded depreciation asset.
SCORE is the sttmofthe unrecorded assets, R&D+-ADV+INV+UGL+AR+DEPR. **AU items are deflated by net operating assets
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TABLE 6
Tests of Hypotheses 
Panel A
Parameter Estimates from Equation (3)
N= 0 0 0 . 0 2 03 04
POOLED FO R  ALL FIRM  YEARS
N=382S -0.107*** 1.16*** 0.980*** -0.283*** -0.016
N=300
PARTITIONED ON CONSERVATISM  SCORE
Mean -0.098*** 0.683*** 2.719*** -0.378** 0.054
Median -0.123 0.617 1.786 -0.090 0.025
Minimum -1.663 -12.329 -18.074 -13.882 -3.996
Maximum 1.137 24.019 32.670 -9.682 4.959
Panel B
Tests of Differences between Conservatism Partitions for 64
_________ Ret ,^ = 80 + 9iXj., + OzAxj., - 63(Abvj.,.|) + G^ oaCj., + ei,_________
Upper (Lower) 150 Partitions Upper (Lower) 100 Partitions
Wilcoxon Rank Sums (8 4 ) 
Test o f  Medians (8 4 )
Test o f  Means (8 4 )
20755 (24395)*** 
87 (63)***
0.192 (-0.084)**
11041 (9059)*** 
62 (38)***
0.269 (-0.004)**
Tests
Ret,
Panel C
of Association with the Conservatism Score
„ = 8 0  + 8 |Xu 82AXL, -  83 (Abvi,,.i) + 84oaCi., + eu
Upper (Lower) 150 Partitions Upper (Lower) 100 Partitions
Pearson Correlation 
Spearman Correlation
0.119**
0.153***
0.129**
0.174***
‘ indicates significance a t .1 “ indicates significance at .OS ‘“ indicates significance at .01. Ail tests for 6 4  are one-tailed. 
CONSERVATISM SCORE is the sum of the unrecorded assets, deflated by net operating assets.
Reti4  is defined as the market-adjusted returns cumulated over the 1 2 -month period ending three months after the fiscal year end for 
firm i, period L
Xu is defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations for firm i, period t; compustat data item tt 18. 
bvu is defined as end-of-period book value for firm i; compustat data item #60.
oacu represents current-period operating accruals for firm L. period t and is defined as [A total assets - A cash and short- term securities 
- A investments and advances, equity method and other) - [A total liabilities - A short-term debt in current liabilities - A long-term 
debt): compustat data items [A# 6  -A # l - A#3t - A #32] - [A #181 -A#34 - A#9|.
All independent variables are scaled by beginning-of-perirxl price, P,.,.
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TABLE 7
Correlations Among Conservatism Score Components and Market-to-Book; By Partition
A/s=iOO Partitions 
328! Firm-years
SCORE R&D ADV !NV UGL AR DEP MKBK Yo
SCORE 1.000 0.405*** 0.929*** -0.029 0.079 0.334*** 0.359*** 0.258*** 0.292***
R<&D 0,824*** 1.000 0.109** -0.042 0.054 0.367** 0.730*** 0.499*** 0.227***
ADV 0.677*** 0.477*** 1,000 -0.051 0.010 0.179*** 0.031 0.093 0.234***
INV 0.037 0.033 -0.095* 1.000 0.037 0.062 0,056 -0.179*** -0.037
UÜL 0.141** 0.081 0.092 0.051 1.000 0.034 0.128** -0.060 -0.012
AR 0,373*** 0.294*** 0.242** 0,026 0.028 1.000 0.461*** 0,177*** 0.225***
DEP 0,901*** 0.750*** 0.531*** 0,031 0,122* 0.373*** 1.000 0.416*** 0.192***
MKBK 0.471*** 0,429*** 0.377*** -0,209*** -0,013 0.109* 0.382*** 1.000 0.204**
h .... 0,174*** 0.096* 0.098* -0.013 -0.043 0.192*** 0.180*** 0,143** 1.000'indicate; significance at .1 "indicates signifieance at .05 "'indicates significance at .01 
K&U is defined as the unreeorded R&D asset requiring no missing data for the current period.
ADV is defined as the unrecorded advertising asset requiring no missing data for the current period.
INV is the unrecorded inventory asset.
IlUL is the unrecorded gains or losses from pension plan assets.
AR is the unrecorded accounts receivable asset DEPR is the unrecorded depreciation asset.
SCORE is the sum of the unrecorded assets, R&D+ADV+INV+UGL+AR+DEPR, all eonservatism score items are deflated by net operating assets. 
M K T 10 B O OK  is the beginning o f  period market-to-book ratio, compustat data items (#199 '  #25)/ #60.
Yu is from equation (I I)ox",,,■= Yooa,.,., + Y i O x * , . , . i  + e,..
TABLE 8
Panel A
Hypothesis Tests for Alternative Conservatism Measures 
Tests of Differences between Partitions for 64 
Ret,.I = 00 + 6 ixi.t + GzAx,.! - 63(Abvi.,.i) + 6400014 + e,..
N=300 Upper (Lower) ISO Partitions Upper (Lower) 100 Partitions
:è
04
WUcoxon M edians Means
R ank Sum s Test Test
TOTAL SCORE
20755 (24395)*** 87 (63)*** 0.192 (-0.084)**
SCORE; R&D + A D V  + IN V
22401(22749) 75(75) -0.049 (-0.052)
SCORE: M A R K E T TO BOOK
22722 (22428) 80 (70)___________ 0.049 (-0.007)_____________
WHcoxon M edians Means
R ank Sum s Test Test
11041 (9059)*** 62(38)*** 0.269 (-0.004)**
9794 (10306) 48(52)
9992 (10108) 53 (47)
-0.054 (0.014)
0.021  (-0 .011 )
TABLE 8 (Continued)
Panel B
Tests of Association with the Conservatism Score 
Equation (3) Retu = 8o + 9iXu + - GstAbvu-i) + 04oaci.t + cu
A ll 300 Partitions Upper and Lower 100 
Partitions
Pearson
Correlation
0.119**
Spearman
Correiation
Pearson
Correlation
04
04
0.031
0209***
TOTAL SC O RE  
0.153*** 0.129**
SCORE: R&D + A D V + I N V  
-0.043 0.026
SCORE: M AR K E T TO BOOK
Spearman
Correlation
0.174**
-0.076
0.049 0235** 0.075
’ indicates significance at .1 ’ ’ indicates significance at .03 ’ ’ ’ indicates significance at .01 Tests are one-tailed
TOTAL SCORE is titc sum o f the unrecorded assets, R&D+ADV+INV+UGL+AR+DEPR, all conservatism score items are deflated
by net operating assets plus the sum of unrecorded operating assets.
MKT to BOOK is the end of period market-to-book ratio, compustat data items (# 199 ’  #23)/ #60.
Reitt is defined as the market-adjusted returns ctrmulated over the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year end for 
firm i, period L
Xu is defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations for firm i. period t; compustat data item #18. 
bvu is defined as end-ofperiod book value for firm i; compustat data item #60.
caCi4  represents current-period operating accruals for firm i. period t and is defined as [A total assets - A cash and short- term 
seorrities - A investments and advances, equity method and other] - [A total liabilities - A short-term debt in current liabilities - A long­
term debt]; compustat data items [A#6 -A#1 -A#31 - A #32]-[A #181 -A #34-A #9].
All independent variables are scaled by beginning-of-period price. P,.,.
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TABLE 9
Firm-Specifîc Analysis 
Panel A
Parameter Estimates from Equation (3)
N=126 00 0 . 01 0 s 04 0 ,+02+03
-0.140*** 0.720 3.754*** -0.861 0.096 3.612***
Panel B
Tests of Dififerences between Partitions for 64; Firm-Specific Analysis
N=IO Upper (Lower) S  Partitions Upper (Lower) 3 Partitions
Wiicoxon
Rank
Sum s
M edians M eans 
Test Test
fViicoxon
R ank
Sum s
M edians
Test
Means
Test
TOTAL SC O RE
04 30 (25) 3 (2) -0.037 (-0.044) 12(9) 2 ( 1) 0.071 (0.033)
04 32(23)
SCORE: 
3 (2 )  -0.020(0.077)
-Kg
18(3) 2 ( 1) 0.173 (0.038)
Panel C
Tests of Association with the Conservatism Score
N=IO A il  10 Partitions Upper and  Lower 3 Partitions
Pearson
Correlation
Spearman
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Spearman
Correlation
04 0255
TOTAL SCO RE
0.164 0.324 0.371
04 0.693**
SCORE: Yn
0.370 0.901*** 0.771**
*indicates significance a t.I **mdicates significance at .OS ***indicates significance at .Of 
TOTAL SCORE is tfte sum of the untecoided assets, RIXADV+iNV+UGL-t-AR+DEPR.
MKT to BOOK is the end of period inailcet-to-book ratio, compustat data items (#199 * #25V #60.
Retu is defined as the marlcet-adjusted returns cumufated over the 12-month period ending three montfis after the fiscal year end for 
firm i, period L
Xu is defined as earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations for firm i, period t: compustat data item # IS. 
bvü is defined as end-of-period book value for firm i; compustat data item #60.
oacu represents current-period operating accruals for firm i, period t  and is defined as [A total assets - A cash and short- term 
securities - A investments and advances, erpiity method and other] - [A total liabilities - A short-term debt in current liabilities - A 
long-term debt]; compustat data items [A # 6 - A #I - A#3l -A«32]-[A#181 -A #34 - A #9|.
All independent variables are scaled by beginning-of-period price, P ,^.
Y» is the intercept from equation (11) ox*u = Yo + YiOx"i.i.i + Cu 
• •  • *>4 // conservatism score items are deflated by net operating assets
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